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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ONE'S JOB: THE CASE

FOR LIMITING EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
Donald H.J. Hermann*
Yvonne S. Sor**

In the United States, employment is generally governed by the "employment-at-will" rule.' Simply stated, the doctrine provides that absent
either a contractual or statutory provision, any employment relationship is
one at will which is terminable by either party, employer or employee, for
cause or no cause. 2 The harsh reality of this rule is that an employer may
discharge an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong. ' 3 Since this
rule applies to the vast majority of American job holders,4 it has a
profound impact on the individual's daily existence. One's fate is in the
hands of his employer. As one commentator has put it:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon
others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they
lose every resource .... Such dependence of the mass of the peo* Professor of Law and Philosophy, De Paul University; A.B. 1965, Stanford University;

M.A. 1979, Northwestern University; J.D. 1968, Columbia University; LL.M. 1974, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1981, Northwestern University.
** Chicago Bar Foundation Research Fellow, B.S. 1970, Mundelein College; M.S. 1972,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1983, DePaul University.
1. See, e.g., Marin v. Jaccuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 553, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882 (1964) ("a
contract for permanent employment is interpreted as a contract for an indefinite period and in the
absence of statutory provisions or public policy considerations is terminable at the will of either
party for any reason whatsoever").
2. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), which provides
a traditional statement of the employment-at-will doctrine in these terms: "The common law rule
. .. is that an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time." Id at 36, 432 A.2d at 467. Seegeneraly Blades,

Employment at Will vs IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power,
67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Note,.A Common Law Actionfor the Abusively DischargedEmployee, 26 HASTINGS L. REV. 1435 (1975).

3. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruledon othergrounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). This position has been reiterated in contemporary opinions. See also Marin v. Jaccuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 553, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882
(19N4).

4. Approximately two-thirds of employees are employees-at-will. See U.S. BUREAU OF
CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 392 (1979) (ta-

ble 644) (total labor force).
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ple upon others for all of their income is something new in the world.
For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.5
While the employment-at-will rule continues to hold sway over employment relationships in the United States, it has nevertheless come
under close scrutiny and increasing attack by both courts and commentators.6 There is a growing consensus that the rule is no longer adequate for
just resolution of the sometimes conflicting desires and interests of employer and employee, and that the rule needs modification consistent with
"the new climate
prevailing generally in the relationship of employer and
'7
employee."
This Article will begin by considering the nature of property and
rights. It will then examine the history of the employment-at-will doctrine
and the present status of the rule in American courts. The suggestion will
be developed that the employment relationship has been transformed by
social and economic developments, and that the law governing employment contracts requires modification to reflect these environmental
changes. The next section will consider the limitations on the claim of
right to employment by considering the legitimate grounds which justify
discharge. Attention will be given to judicial efforts at modifying the employment-at-will doctrine. Various approaches will be suggested which
would protect employers' interests in maintaining control of their work
force while, at the same time, giving expression to the legitimate claims
and expectations of their workers. It will be suggested, however, that the
courts have gone as far as they can, or probably will, in their efforts at
judicial activism in modifying the employment-at-will doctrine. Consequently legislative reform will be suggested. To assist in identifying the
form that such reform might take, this Article will undertake a comparative analysis by examining the approaches of some European nations to
the problem of employment dismissals. This analysis should provide valuable insight for development of an appropriate framework for legal reform
in the United States.
The Article will conclude by providing a model statute which attempts to develop a legitimate basis for an employee's claim of right on his
or her job by bringing employees who are presently without legal protection within the ambit of statutory protection, independent of that provided
by existing labor legislation. Substantive criteria for maintenance of one's
employment and for termination will be established. Procedural safeguards will be set forth, which can provide a basis for adjudicating property claims to one's job. The employer's proper right to discharge will also
be recognized, by identifying legitimate limitations on the employee's
claim of right and through the establishment of grounds and procedures
for proper employment dismissal. It is the contention of the authors that
such a statute would provide a viable and efficient means of protecting the
legitimate expectation of employees by recognizing a property interest in
their jobs or employment.
5. F. TANNENBAUM, A PHmIosoPmy OF LABOR 9 (1951), quoted in Blades, supra note 2, at

1404.

6. See infra notes 42, 46, 58, 68 & 69 and accompanying text.
7. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
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I.

RIGHTS AND PROPERTY

In recent years, the subjects of "rights" and "property" have received
increased attention in legal and philosophical writing.8 Much of this work
has been theoretical, and has attempted to refine these concepts and to
provide justification for claims made on the basis of rights in property. 9
The aim of this Article is to examine the implications of some of this work
for a contemporary claim of right by considering the issue of whether a
salaried employee can plausibly claim a property right in his job, and to
analyze the extent to which the law does or can provide a means for accommodating such a claim.
First, it is necessary to understand what it means to have a right, and
to determine what justifies a claim so that it may be said to give rise to a
right. Rights have significance in that they establish claims by which a
person can demand recognition by others of freely asserted interests, or
they provide a basis for establishing a license to engage in certain conduct.' 0 The notion of protected interest here is generally thought to include
exercise of one's physical and mental faculties, as well as exercise of control over one's possessions.' To have a right implies that others have a
duty to recognize one's claim, and not to interfere with one's interests, conduct, or exercise of control over the same. 12 This implies not only a liberty
8. This increased attention is reflected in the publication of recent yearbooks of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, which in 1981 dealt with the subject of human
rights and in 1980 with the issue of property. See 23 NOMOS: HUMAN RIGHTS (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds.) (1981); 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.) (1980). Two
valuable collections of recent papers on these subjects are RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE (D.
Lyons ed. 1979) and PROPERTY, PROFITS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE (V. Held ed. 1980). Examples
of individual works examining these topics are L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS (1977) and R. DwORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
9. On the subject of property, see, for example, Grunebaum, Two Justffcations ofProperty,
17 AM. PHIL. Q. 53-58 (1980); Snare, The Concepts of Property, AM. PHIL. Q. 200-06 (1972). On
the subject of rights, see, for example, Machan, Some Recent Work in Human Rights Theory, 17
AM. PHIL. Q. 103-15 (1980); Martin & Nickel, Recent Work on the Concept ofRights, 17 AM. PHIL.
Q. 165-80 (1980). See generally, Martin & Nickel,A Bibliographyon the Nature and~oundations of
Rights, 1947-1977 6 POL. THEORY 395-413 (1978).
10. This is the notion of claim right which is relatively uncontroversial and described in basic
discussions of ethics. See J. MACKIE, ETHICS (1977), where this concept is explicated in the following terms:
To say that someone has a certain claim-right may similarly be to say that if he claims
(or if someone representing him claims on his behalf) whatever it is that he has this right
to, the system will support his obtaining what he claims--or (speaking within the system)
to say that he has this right may be to give him this support, typically imposing on one or
more or indefinitely many others the duty of fulfilling the claim if it is made.
Id at 173. See generally A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS (1977).
11. See Peffer, A Defense of Rights to Well-Being, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 65-87 (1978).
12. See, for example, PROPERTY, PROFrrs AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 3-4,
where it is argued:
Although there is no clear consensus of what rights are, I shall take the position that
rights are central and stringent entitlements yielded byjustfable rules orprincples. The
rights of one person impose obligations on others, as the rights of a person not to be
assaulted imposes obligations on other persons not to assault that person. The obligations
that rights impose may be both obligations not to interfere and obligations to enable, as
when the right of a child to live imposes obligations on others to provide the child with
food and shelter.
(emphasis added). See generally C. WELLMAN, LegalRights in SXRTRYCH UR, UPPSALASKOLANOCH EFTERAT 213-21 (1978).
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to be exercised by the right holder but also a freedom from interference by
others in the exercise of the liberty established by the claim of right.13 Legal rules may permit one either to prevent the interference by others,' 4 or
to compel others to act in conformity with recognition of one's claim.' 5
While rights seem to establish fundamental claims, rights are not necessarily absolute in the sense of being unqualified. 16 Competing rights of others
may limit the extent of a claim, and may determine the conditions under
17
which a claim can be made.
To argue that one has a right to a job might mean that one has a right
to employment.' 8 This would constitute a claim of right against society, by
which one would require society to provide an opportunity for each person
to earn the necessary means of support. While an argument can be made
for such a claim, a much narrower claim of right is being considered in this
Article.
The narrower claim of right to a job against a specific employer involves a presumptive claim to retain a position of employment which one
has obtained through voluntary contractual relations. This claim is established as an interest growing out of a relationship based on contribution to
an enterprise in which one is employed and is further based on the need to
have some assurance of a continued position providing the necessary
means of support.' 9 In addition, there is a reliance basis for the em13. See Plamenatz, Rights, 24 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 75-82 (1950),
where the definition of right is seen as involving both liberty and claim right. Plamenatz maintains: "A man (or an animal) has a right whenever other men ought not to prevent him doing

what he wants or refuse him some service he asks for or needs." Id at 74.
14. This view is the concept of right transformed into the notion of legal liberty or privilege.
See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED TO JUDICIAL REASONINO
38-50 (1923).
15. This is the concept of right transformed into the notion of legal power. See W.
HOHFELD, supra note 14, at 30-60.

16. This view is adopted by most contemporary legal philosophers. See, for example, Hart,

Are There Any NaturalRights, 64 PHIL. REv. 175-91 (1955), where it is asserted: "[N]o man has

an absolute or unconditional right to do or not to do any particular thing or be treated in any
particular way." Id at 176.
17. See, for example, PROPERTY, PROFITS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 4, where
the notion of rights being limited by other rights is explicated with reference to a need to develop a
basis for resolving conflicting claims of right such as the right of an employee to his or her job and
the right of the employer to terminate an employee. "Rights are not absolute, whether they are
moral rights or legal rights. PrimaFacie rights, or what appear to be rights' first sight', may have
to yield to other rights with greater stringency. When rights conflict, we need additional principles
or rules to determine priorities between rights. . . ." Id at 4.
18. See Nickel, Is There 4 Human Right to Employment, 10 PHIL. F. 149-70 (1978).

19. An analogy to and an explication of the theoretical underpinnings of this claim are provided by A. Melden's discussion of promises giving rise to rights and obligations. See A. MELDEN,
supra note 10, at 40, where the relation of promising and creation of rights and obligations is set
out; Melden asks rhetorically: "But what is the specific obligation incurred by promising?" Id at
40. To which he responds:
Surely this is an obligation to the person to whom the promise was made. That obligation is the very same moral relation, viewed from the point of view of the promiser, as
the right which the promisee has with respect to the promiser. In short, the promiser
who ought to keep his promise is obliged to perform the act in question because of the
part.
And if thebypromiser
whothefails
to engage
right conferred
him upon
other
person,ina that
rightperformance
to a certain isperformance
placed outside
on his
the
this
losspale
canoronly
moral
that
losesbehis
moral
credit
because
his failure
he has
keep his word, the reason for
violated
the of
right
that he to
himself
has conferred upon the
promisee.
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ployee's claim to a right in his job based on the fact that in accepting and
continuing in a particular job, he has forgone other employment opportunities and the security they might offer. The longer one continues in a
particular position, the greater that reliance becomes since with age the
employee has decreasing opportunities to obtain an alternative position
and over time the employee's skills can become specialized to the demands
of his particular job. A claim of right to ajob implies a duty on the part of
an employer to recognize an individual's claim to a position and to the
related means of earning a livelihood. Such a claim to a job is not necessarily unqualified; it may presuppose continued economic viability of the
employing enterprise, continued need for the services of a particular position or range of activities, and even a continued level of employee performance including productive activity and conformity to an understood
standard of behavior. The essential feature of such a claim to a job, however, is an implicit restriction on the ability of an employer to arbitrarily
terminate an employee.
Also, a claim to a property right in a job requires some understanding
of the nature and justification of property claims. Two approaches to
property claims have dominated Anglo-American thought. The first views
all property claims as rights to use, transfer and dispose of interests derived
from grants by the state and established by action of law.20 According to
this view property is entirely the creature of law, and any claim to property
can be established only by reference to positive law.21 A second tradition
bases property claims in human nature or in social activity.22 According to
this tradition, a person has a right to his labor, and a person justifies a
claim to property based on the fact that one has invested labor in an object
or enterprise. 23 Similarly, an individual can be said to have a claim to
property growing out of cooperative social practices. 24 A person's particiId

20. This is the view of legal positivism which has its foundations in the work of Thomas
Hobbes, who was quite explicit in developing the view that all individual actions with regard to
property were necessarily empowered by authority granted by the law. According to Hobbes, the
idea of property as right or title does not arise in the state of nature but comes with the establishment of the commonwealth or civil state. Hobbes writes: "The distribution of the materials of this
nourishment, is the constitution of mine, and thine, and his; that is to say, in one word/propiety;
and belongeth in all kinds of commonwealth." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185-86 (M. Oakeshott ed.
1962).
21. This view is developed by Jeremy Bentham. See J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL
225 (H. Hart ed. 1970), where Bentham states: "Now begin with property. Now property before it
can be offended against must be created: and the creation of it is the work of law." Id
22. This is the tradition of modem natural law theory which is best exemplified by John
Locke's discussion of the origin and nature of property in Chapter V of The Second Treatise. See
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 303-20. (P. Lastlett ed. 1967).
23. According to this view, labor creates a basis for a property claim as a result of the increase in value caused by the application of labor. See J. LOCKE, supra note 22, at 306: "[Ljabour
put at distinction between them and common. That added something to them more than Nature,
the common Mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right."
24. This modification of Locke's theory is necessitated by the fact that there are no longer
resources free in the state of nature to which one can directly apply one's labor. Rather, one
necessarily finds oneself part of a co-operative process which has social dimensions. See PROPERTY, PROFITS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supra note 8,at 5-6, where it is argued that:
Locke's assumptions concerning the justifiable acquisition of property are, however, seldom plausible in the contemporary world. The unowned wilderness waiting to be appropriated, so central to Locke's argument, no longer exists. Rarely do we simply mix our
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pation in cooperative activity gives rise to a society's wealth, and through a
process of mutual recognition and reciprocity one establishes claims to
possession and use of a portion of that social product.
To say that one has a property right in one's job is, according to the
positivist tradition, simply to mean that the law recognizes a claim or interest to retain one's employment position.2 5 One might claim on moral
grounds that, in the absence of recognition of such a right, the law should
be modified to provide a basis for such a claim; but ultimately the right to
a job would depend on the law's recognition of such a right. However, if
one invokes the second tradition, he is viewed as having a property right in
his labor and concomitantly a right in the product of his labor. Then there
is a basis prior to the law's recognition of property right to a claim of a
right in one's job to the extent that the job is a product of one's labor.2 6 If
one's labor has been incorporated into a product and service, for which a
wage has been received, and if that wage captures the full value of such
service, then there is no basis for any further claim to one's job. To the
extent, however, that one's labor value is not fully captured in a salary or
wage, there may be a basis for a further claim to the employment position
which has been enhanced by one's labor. Alternatively, it may be argued
that the joint activity of those employed along with the efforts and investment of employers produces not only the value of wages and profit, but
also a social product reflected in the value of the ongoing enterprise in
which those associated with the enterprise have a vested property interest
including interests in employment as well as the good will and the value of
an ongoing enterprise.2 7 It is such a vested interest in the ongoing enterprise which, according to this second view of property, provides a plausible
claim by employees to a right of continued employment subject to the type
of limitations which have already been identified.
While there appears to be a plausible theoretical ground for an employee to make a claim to a property interest in his job, the positive law
has moved slowly in establishing or recognizing such a right. Rather, the
law has treated the employment relationship as providing for a claim to
wages as compensation for the rendering of labor, with an employee having the right to freely withdraw from continued employment. However,
this reciprocity of claim to wages and claim to labor is subject to a reciprocal power to terminate employment absent any agreed-upon limitations. 2 8
Thus, an employee cannot be compelled to continue his employment (sublabor with nature. Nearly always we mix our labor with an economic system, an industrial economy, and it makes little sense to think of the result as the outcome of our labor.
A person's labor cannot be distinguished from the other labor it is mixed with in produc-

ing a product or contributing to production.
25. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 84: "For Bentham one has a right because it is given

to him by the law, in Bentham's terms one is 'favored' by the law just in that case where it bestows
upon him a right."
26. See J. LocKE, supra note 22, at 317. "Thus Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of
Property, where-ever anyone was pleased to imploy it, upon what was common, which remained,
a long while, the for greater part, and is yet more than Mankind makes use of."
27. See, eg., T. DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS & MORALITY 153-56 (1982).
28. See Feinman, The Development ofthe Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEoAL HIST.

118-35 (1976).
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ject to very special limitations), and reciprocally an employer cannot be
compelled to continue the employment of a worker (except under the
terms of the particular labor contract). 29 To the extent that the employment-at-will theory rests upon such a perceived reciprocity, it fails to recognize fundamental features of the actual socio-economic relationship. In
a highly developed complex economy, it is not realistic to view a laborer as
completely uninhibited in choosing to maintain or to seek employment.
Given the nature of the economy and the state of the work force, many
factors limit mobility and act to reduce the employment opportunities of a
worker over time and space. The relative imbalance of power, which generally favors the employer, makes an analysis based on perceived reciprocal powers and duties one which fails to account for the true nature of the
labor market. Clearly, the employment-at-will doctrine favors employers;
arguably, it denies employees their right to jobs and a right to the related
means to a livelihood. The failure to recognize a right to one's job denies
one control over central features of one's life. In our society, work or gainful employment occupies a central role in the person's life, because the job
both provides the basic resources to meet most people's needs and is related to their sense of identity and self worth.30 Thus, there are very strong
interests on which employees can base their claim to a right to their job.
Now, this Article will turn to a consideration of whether there is a legal
basis or a framework for establishing such a right.
II.

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE

A. History of the Doctrine
Until the late nineteenth century, the law governing the employment
relationship was characterized as "master-servant" law. 31 The master-servant relationship was construed chiefly as a domestic relation; accordingly,
the household was its model.3 2 Work was performed by servants either in
the house or in the master's shop. These workers were described as "menial" because they lived intra moena-within the walls of the master's
house. 33 The legal relationship between the parties was construed in terms
of the law of contracts. 34 Contract terms such as duration and wages to be
agreement, but
paid were theoretically subject to bargaining and mutual
35
were in actuality based on the customs of the trade.
The master-servant relationship in Anglo-American law as it existed
from the seventeenth through the early nineteenth centuries consisted of
29. See P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 130-37 (1969); Note, Implied
Contract Rights to Job Securiy, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974).
30. E.g., Kahn, The Meaning of Work: Interpretationand ProposalforMeasurement, in THE
HUMAN MEANING OF SOCIAL CHANGE (A. Campbell & P. Converse eds. 1972) (a review of the

social science literature on the importance of work).

31. See generally P. SELZNICK, supra note 29, at 123; Feinman, supra note 28.
32. Feinman, supra note 28, at 120; Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding ofthe Employ.
ment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REv. 457 (1979).
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 738 (5th ed. 1979). See also I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
425 (1941).
34. See, e.g., Parker v. Ibbeston, 140 Eng. Rep. 1118 (1858).
35. Id
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several basic elements. 36 The first element was relational and was characterized by the master's power to command and the servant's duty to obey;
accordingly, the terms of this relationship gave rise to a power or authority
37
in the master to discipline or to terminate the service of the employee.
The second element of the relationship was that it was for a term, a speci38
fied or implied time of service, and thus not strictly a relationship at will.
In the absence of a contrary agreement, the employment relationship was
construed to be for a period of one year.39 A third element of the relationship can be characterized as paternalism; generally, the master was responsible for the safety, physical well-being, and even the moral condition of
the employee.4° Although the master-servant doctrine was considered a
contractual relation, it was actually a status-oriented relationship. This situation, however, began to change with the advent of the Industrial
Revolution. 41 Along with the transformation to an industrial economy,
characterized by factory employment, there was a corresponding transformation of the master-servant law into one governed by distilled contract
principles including independence, mutuality and freedom of contract.
What became known as free-employment contract theory took form durdevelopment prevalent in the secing the period of laissez-faire economic
42
ond half of the nineteenth century.
The principal legal corollary of the social institution of the free market was freedom of contract. 43 The contract was the principal legal instrument which underlay the new economic order and provided the basis for
36. See generally P. SELZNICK, supra note 29, at 125.
37. Id at 125.

38. Id at 126.
39. Id
40. Id at 127.
41. Elaborating on the history of the doctrine, one commentator remarked: "The uneven
relevance of master-servant doctrine had a limited importance before the Industrial Revolution

...
A truly contractual theory ofemployment did not emerge until the concept of a free market
gained ascendance in economic life." P. SELZNICK, supra note 29, at 130. Accord Feinman, supra
note 28, at 124; Glendon & Lev, supra note 32, at 457-58.
42. See Note, supra note 29, where the author observed: "At that time [the late nineteenth
century] the prevalent ideology was laissez faire and its corollary freedom of contract. . . . A
more precise term for the philosophy ... is freedom of enterprise, which was considered to include the. . . 'fundamental right' of the employer to discharge employees as he or she pleased."
Id at 343. Accord P. SELZNICK, supra note 29, at 130; Glenton & Lev supra note 32, at 458.
The term laissez-faire meaning "let things proceed without interference" originated in France
as early as the first half of the eighteenth century, and was adopted by Adam Smith as a rule of
practical economic conduct. See H. SLOAN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 191 (1961). The principle was expressed in the assertion that the individualis most productive when allowed to follow his
own self-interest without external restrictions. Adam Smith expressed his opinion on the strength
of the individual in these terms:
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert
itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without
any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity but
of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions....
A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK IV 508 (E. Cannan ed. 1937). The doctrine of laissez-faire provided the foundation for the concept of free market which was extended to include
the notion of a free market for labor with the consequence that labor was perceived as a commodity subject to exchange.
43. See generally J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
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its growth. 44 Contract theory provided for and validated the mutual rights
and obligations of "free" parties bargaining in permitted transactions.
Against the background of a laissez-faire economy the new employment
relationship took shape.
This theory of free contract as applied to employment relationships
presumed a freedom of the employee to bargain with the employer as to
the terms of the employment relationship. This included the implied right
to withdraw from the employment relationship, subject to specific contractual limitations. 45 Concomitantly, the employment contract implicitly allowed the employer to maintain a "fundamental right" to discharge
employees at his discretion.46 According to one nineteenth century commentator, the terms of the employment relationship were governed by an
inflexible rule which provided that employment wasprimafacie a hiring at
will, and if an employee claimed that his employment was for a term, say a
year, the burden was on him to establish it by proof of explicit contractual
terms.47 Any employment, whether it be ostensibly for a day, week, month
or year, or without a time being specified, was considered an indefinite
term, and no presumption attached that it was for a day even, but only at
the rate fixed for whatever time the party actually served. 48 Thus, even the
implied terms present in the master-servant relationship were eliminated.
The employment relationship became one of simple contract, consisting of
terms agreed upon by the parties with power in either party to withdraw at
any time, absent contractual terms to the contrary.
The doctrine that employment was governed solely by contractual
terms and characterized as employment-at-will unless specifically agreed
otherwise, was adopted by most state courts and gave rise to a variety of
propositions or constructions which were developed and adopted by courts
in their interpretation of employment contracts. 49 This judicial activity
was necessitated by an apparent ambiguity in the principle of at-will em44. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 464-68 (1973), where the author remarked: "The law of contract occupies a special place in American law in the 19th century ....
[I]n theory the whole century was the century of contract. Contract was identified as the single
most important hallmark of modem law." Id at 464. See also J. HURST, supra note 43, at 14.
45. See, for example, Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled, Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 187 (1941), wherein the court observed:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its
essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon
which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the
employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the
right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employee.
id at 174-75.
46. See, for example, Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd sub nom.
Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980), where the court summarized the defendant's position which said that "because of the doctrine of 'mutuality of obligation,' in an employment contract . . . plaintiff was not bound. She could leave her position at her will. The
mutuality doctrine then mandates that because the employee is not bound, the employer is not
bound, even if it makes representation to the contrary." Id at 214. See generally P. SELZNICK,
supra note 29, at 131; Note, Protectingat Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
To Terminate in GoodFaith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980); Note, supra note 29, at 343.
47. H. WOOD, MASTER & SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
48. Id
49. See infra notes 50, 52 & 57 and accompanying text.
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ployment, which arose in early employment contract disputes. This ambiguity arose out of the apparent inconsistency which developed by the
holding of employment contracts, ostensibly for a term, to be in fact for an
indefinite period and subject to termination at-will.
An early case which applied the employment-at-will rule to a situation where the employee claimed that the contract was not merely for a
term, but one providing for a "permanent" position was Perry v.
Wheeler.50 This case involved a minister who had been elected "permanent" rector of a church. After a dispute with the congregation, an ecclesiastical review board recommended that the relationship be severed, despite
the minister's insistence that he had a right to maintain his rectorship and
thus to continue his employment. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that
although the minister had been elected "permanent" rector, "it was intended [by the parties that the minister] should continue to hold the place
[only] until one or the other of the contracting parties should desire to
terminate the connection, in which case the dissatisfied party was to have
the right to be relieved of further obligations. . ..",1
The Perry decision was perhaps independently explained by reference
to the terms of the special relationship between a minister and his congregation. The case was cited, however, as precedent in Lord v. Goldberg,5 2 a
California case, for the proposition that even outside the special case of
clerical employment, "permanent" did not mean lifetime employment. In
Lord, the employee had been given written assurance that he would have
permanent employment as solicitor "so long as he should use his best efforts" to extend the employer's business. 53 However, the employer had
severed the relationship on the basis that the employee had misrepresented
his capabilities at the time of hiring. The California Supreme Court held
that it was "clear that plaintiffs employment was not intended to be for
life, or for any fixed or certain period;" rather, it was to continue indefinitely, or until one of the parties should wish to terminate the relation.5 4
Although the special facts of misrepresentation provided an independent
basis for termination in Lord, the observations concerning the implicit
power of either party to terminate the employment were viewed as a significant statement of the law governing employment contracts.
While both the Perry and Lord courts found an implied right of atwill termination within the employment agreements, the opinions implicitly adopted the propositions that employment should be based upon "fair
and equitable terms"5 5 and that termination should be only for "good
cause."'5 6 The decisions, however, were interpreted by subsequent courts
as construing "permanent" to mean "indefinite" employment, terminable
at the will of either party. Of the two principles implied by construction,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

75 Ky. (11 Bush) 541 (1877).
Id at 548-49.
81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889).
Id at 598, 22 P. at 1127.
Id at 601-02, 22 P. at 1128.
Penry, 75 Ky. (I1Bush) at 549.

56. Lord, 81 Cal. at 601-02, 22 P. at 1128.
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only the proposition that the terms of employment be "fair and equitable,"
which was understood to be reciprocal, survived in later cases; the goodcause requirement was either abandoned or forgotten. 57 Thus, courts
viewed all employment contracts in the same manner: Absent a special
contractual provision to the contrary, permanent employment means indefinite employment or employment-at-will, and therefore, terminable at
the will of either the employer or the employee. 58 This legal posture was
taken by most American courts in employment cases. At the turn of the
century, the employment-at-will doctrine was tested in the United States
Supreme Court, where it received full endorsement in two landmark
cases.5 9 The Court's analysis was rooted in the notion of reciprocity as
articulated under the contract doctrine of mutuality. The Court maintained that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee is equivalent
to, and reciprocal with, the employee's right to resign; the Court implicitly
considered the
two parties to be on equal footing in their contractual
60
relationship.
The Court first held the employment-at-will rule to be constitutional
in Adair v. United States.61 In this case, the court held unconstitutional a
federal statute which protected unionized employees from dismissal based
upon their union membership. 62 The Court held that the statute constituted an unwarranted interference with the employer's right to enter into
and to terminate employment contracts. 63 This position was reaffirmed in
Coppage v. Kansas,64 where the Court declared unconstitutional a Kansas
statute forbidding "yellow dog" contracts requiring employees to agree not
to join a union as a condition of employment. The Court held that such
statutes violated the parties' freedom of contract. 65 While the Court did
recognize that the employer and employee may not be on equal footing in
the bargaining process, 66 it implicitly upheld the employer's property
rights to be paramount over the employee's rights to his job. The Court
specifically recognized the possible inequality in bargaining position, but
57. See, for example, Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A.Ry. Co., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 756
(1904), where the court held that "permanent employment" meant "employment for an indefinite
time, which may be severed by either party and [sluch contracts, in the absence of special considerations ... are terminable at any time by either party." Id at 673, 98 N.W. at 760.
58. In Williams v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1956), the Supreme Court
of Missouri enunciated the rule as follows: "Unless there is a contract pertaining to the duration
of the employment or limiting the reasons for which the employee may be discharged the employment is at the will of either party, and the employer may terminate the relationship at any time."
Id at 39. See generally Note, supra note 29, at 345; Note, Non-Statutory Causes of Actionfor an
Employer'r Termination of an "At Will" Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 743 (1979).

59. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908), which were both overruled in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941). See
also Note, supra note 29, at 346-47; Note, supra note 58, at 746-47.
60. See infra notes 63, 65, 66 & 67 and accompanying text.
61. 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
62. Id at 179.
63. Id at 180.
64. 236 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1915), overruled, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187
1941).
65. Id at 13.
66. Id at 17-18.
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67
held that this concern was overridden by the employer's property rights.
Clearly the Court was aware of the conflict between the interests of
the employer and employee, but held that the employer's rights prevailed.
Thus, the Court either implicity rejected the claim of right asserted by the
employee or determined that the employer's right to terminate prevailed
over any claim of right by the employee.
Nevertheless, the conflict between the interest of an employee in his
job and the terms by which it is held, and the employer's rights growing
out of his ownership of the firm, has continued to confront courts and legislatures alike. Legislatures and courts have been encouraged to recognize
that both employees and employers have vested and potentially conflicting
interests in the employment relationship and that such interests require a
principled basis for resolution when conflicts arise between the employer's
desire to terminate and the employee's claim to retain employment. The
earliest modification of the employment-at-will doctrine came in the form
of legislation and judicial interpretation thereof.

B. Legislative Mod'leations
A fundamental purpose of both federal and state labor legislation is to
redress the inherent imbalance in the bargaining positions between the individual employees and employer which is exacerbated when the employer
operates in the form of a large and powerful corporation. 68 These statutes
attempt to strengthen the bargaining position of the employee in his contractual relationship with the employer, and effectively abandon the employment-at-will doctrine with statutory69 imposition of limitations on the
employers' right to dismiss its workers.
67. Id at 18-19. The United States Supreme Court observed that the state court had noted
that employees were not financially able to bargain for explicit terms in their employment contracts. Id at 17. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a system of pri-

vate property inevitably leads to inequalities of wealth and bargaining power. Id at 17-18. Thus,
it was natural that parties agreeing to an employment contract would be affected by differences in
wealth and bargaining power. Id at 41 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68. From Congressional debates of 1935 that led to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) (NLRA), it is clear that equality of bargaining power be-

tween employers and employees was a major objective: "The second major objective of the bill is
to encourage, by developing the procedure of collective bargaining, that equality of bargaining
,power which is prerequisiteto equality of opportunity andfreedorm of contract...

"

S. REP. No.

573, 74TH CONG., 1ST Sass. 2 (1935) (emphasis added). See generally Feliu, Dischargeof Profes.
sional Employees: ProtectingAgainst DisrmissalforActs Within a Professional Code af Ethics, 11

COLUM. HUMAN RiGHTs L. Rav. 149, 156 (1979); Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust
Dismissal: Timeefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 491-92 (1976); Note, supra note 46, at 1826.
69. For example, the NLRA recognized this imbalance as consisting of an inequality in bar-

gaining power resulting from the fact that employees lacked full freedom of association and even
actual liberty of contract following from inequality in bargaining power. Employers had not only
the position of power given them by the corporation, as well as its wealth, but also are free to form

associations for their collective interests. The right to form labor unions and to bargain collectively was seen as necessary for restoring equality of bargaining power between employees and
employer. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See also Norris-La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976);
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976); Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976). The principal goal of these statutes has been to legiti-

mize employee unionization as a compensating force against the theretofore unfettered power of
the employer. See generally W. MALLONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION
545-639 (1974) [hereinafter cited as W. MALLONE].
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1. FederalLegislation
The initial federal enactment which gave a measure of employee protection against wrongful dismissal was the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) passed by Congress in 1935.70 Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees
the employees' right "to engage in. . . concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 7 1 The right to
unionize is the most important right granted by this statute. The right is
bolstered by section 8(3) of the NLRA (now section 8(a)(3)) which prohibits the employer from discriminating in employment "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 72 Thus, the employer's
freedom to dismiss is significantly restricted as a result of this statutory
protection, while the statute itself does not prohibit an employer from dismissing an employee for reasons other than his union activities. This right
itself has provided the means for workers to bargain for additional restrictions on the employer.
Thus, nearly all collective bargaining agreements established under
the procedures provided by the NLRA require "just cause" for dismissal.
This provision has been subject to repeated interpretation by labor arbitrators, and today there is a considerable body of decisions outlining the parameters of what constitutes a wrongful discharge.73 Where it is found
that the employee has been wrongfully discharged, one of the remedies
available to him or her is reinstatement. 74
The constitutionality of the NLRA was upheld in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.75 The United States Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate labor relations at any manufacturing plant involved in
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976).
71. Id. § 157.
72. Id § 158(a)(3).
73. For example, see Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 451 (1957), where the
criteria for reasonable or just cause dismissal were outlined as follows:
(1) Determination of reasonable cause must be made as of time of discharge; (2) discharge originally based on arbitrary or capricious considerations may not be justified by
subsequent developments; (3) disciplinary action may not be said to be based on reasonable cause if, after it is taken on impulse, search for justifying reasons is made; (4) reasonable cause must rest on employee'sfailureinjob relationsandnot uponpersonalpreference
orprediectionsof the employer....
Id at 451-52 (emphasis added). Also, in Great Western Malting Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 660
(1976), the 'just cause" standard was applied even in the absence of such a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement between the union and the employer;, the arbitrator applied the "just cause"
standard even though the employment contract did not explicitly include it, on the ground that it
was an implied term reflecting a "prevailing standard in labor agreements;" further, it was asserted by the arbitrator that '[t]o adopt a lesser standard would result in a basic inequality within
the collective bargaining process." Id at 664. Finally, in RLC & Son Trucking, 70 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 600 (1978), the "just cause" criterion was again used even where it was not expressly provided for in the contract on the ground that language in the contract to the effect that refusal of an
employee to cross a picket line or to handle materials of striking worker "shall not be cause for
discipline or discharge." The implication of recognizing certain conduct as not to constitute good
cause for dismissal was held to be implicit recognition that any dismissal would have to be for
good cause shown. Id at 602.
74. The NLRA provides that where an unfair labor practice is established, the Board shall
issue a cease and desist order and provide for reinstatement where appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976).
75. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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interstate commerce. 76 The Court reexamined its position on the disparity
of bargaining power between employer and employee which it had accepted as natural to a free enterprise economy in Adair and Coppage, and
validated the authority of Congress to reconstitute the terms of this bargaining relationship in order to provide for greater equality of the parties,
and to provide for recognition and enforcement of worker claims of right.
funThe Court recognized that employees' right to self-organization was a 77
damental right which arose from the very nature of the labor market. It
was apparent to the Court that an employee was relatively powerless in his
dealings with an employer. The Court also recognized the dependence of
the worker on his wage for the maintenance of himself and family. 7 8
Moreover, the Court recognized that if an employer refused to bargain as
to the terms of employment, and refused to pay a wage which the worker
felt was fair, the worker was in fact powerless, and generally unable to
79
reject the terms offered by the employer given the necessity of work.
Thus, the Court concluded that a "union was essentialto give laborersopportunity to deal on an equality with their employer." 80
Clearly the Court's interpretation of the NLRA, in Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., modified its previous commitment to a laissez-faire analysis
which characterized its decisions inAdair and Coppage at least in regard to
the idea of mutuality in employment contracts. The Court gave explicit
recognition to employee rights which were identified and were treated as
having been given protection as a result of Congressional action. Minimally, the Court held that the government could intervene in the employer-employee relationship and protect the employee against certain
practices on the basis of unfairness or other articulated public policy
objectives.
The Court, nevertheless, limited its decision to industrial employees
whose activities were within the purview of interstate commerce and who
were engaged in industrial employment and who were the intended subjects of the Congressional enactment. 8 ' Consequently, the Court's decision explicitly excluded a great number of employees who thus continued
to be employees-at-will.
An additional adjustment of the imbalance of the employee-employer
relations was provided in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 This
76. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Act's constitutionality by stating:
We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be construed so as to oper-

ate within the sphere of constitutional authority.
[The Act] purports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct that
commerce and, thus qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the exercise of control within constitutional bounds.
Id at 30, 31.
77. Id at 33.
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id at 36-41. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to address the inequality
of bargaining power in all employment contracts, regardless of a showing that a particular employment contract affected interstate commerce.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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legislation was explicitly aimed at protecting employees from discriminatory practices.8 3 Congress made it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment because the employee opposed practices that were considered
unlawful employment practices by Title VII.84 In addition to this protection provided by Title VII, employers were further prohibited from discriminating among employees on the basis of sex with reference to
87
86
wages, 85 and on the basis of age or handicap.
The Civil Rights Act and the National Labor Relations Act constitute
the most influential and effective pieces of federal legislation providing for
the protection of employees against unjust dismissal. Through enactment
of this legislation, Congress demonstrated that the employment-at-will
doctrine was no longer the principal foundation for employment contracts.
Furthermore, these enactments are evidence that the employee-employer
relationship can be modified to meet the conomic conditions of contemporary society, and more generally, to give protection to the legitimate interests and expectations of employees by creating or recognizing specific
rights in the employment relationship. In addition to the above statutes,
the federal government has enacted other legislation that has further limited the employer's formerly absolute power of discharge.8 8 The result of
such legislation is the establishment of a qualified right of an employee to
his or her job and reciprocally to impose a duty on an employer not to
discharge an employee on one of the proscribed basis.
In addition to union employees, civil service workers are statutorily
protected in their employment relationship. 89 This category of employee
may not be dismissed except "for unacceptable performance" 90 or "for
83. Id

84. Id § 2000e-3(a).
85. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
86. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1976).

87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
88. Employees in various statuses are given statutory protection from wrongful dismissal.
Veterans are protected by the Veterans Preference Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976) (grants veterans
the right to return to their former jobs and prohibits discharge for one year). Debtors are protected by the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976) (forbids discharge of
employees whose wages are garnished for indebtedness). Jurors are given protection by the Jury
System Improvements Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (Supp. IV 1978) (prohibits discharge of employees who serve on jury duty). Moreover, many recent statutes provide additional protection
for an employee against possible reprisal taken by his or her employer in response to the employee's assertion of a right under various acts. For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976), the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1977, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. IV 1980), Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651
(1976) all contain a section prohibiting discharge of employees exercising their right under these
Acts. While each of these provisions is in furtherance of the purpose and enforcement of the
specific statute in which the relevant protection is provided, which in turn reflect adoption of
specific policies by Congress, it must be recognized that these protections afforded to private emp!oyees significantly restrict the employer's otherwise unqualified right of discharge and implicitly
give rise to or recognition of employee rights in a job.
89. These employees are covered by the Civil Service Act, ch. 27, § 1,72 Stat. 403 (1883). See
generally Chaturvedi, Legal ProtectionAvailable to FederalEmployees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 287 (1968).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (Supp. IV 1980). The statutory mandate also provides for informing the
employee of the reasons for the "unacceptable performance" evaluation. Id § 4303(b)(1)(A).

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

such cause as will promote the efficiency of the [civil] service." 9 1 One commentator has suggested that the development of these protections for civil
service employees against discharges in the absence of serious misconduct
results in these workers having "the equivalent of life tenure" after a short
probationary period. 92 The discharge of a government employee is clearly
more restricted than is discharge in the case of the private sector employee;
in the case of a civil service employee not only is dismissal restricted to
"for cause" showings, but further, dismissal can occur only after the
worker is afforded the required procedural protections. 93
The courts have interpreted Congress' purpose in creating these protections for public employees to limit the government's discretionary dismissal power and thus ensure that an employee cannot be removed for
arbitrary or capricious reasons. 94 This does not provide an absolute claim
on a government job because a public employee can still be removed for
cause. The courts have balanced several items in providing and fashioning
relief under the Civil Service Act, including the public interest behind the
governmental action, the private right involved and the degree of injury to
the individual government employee. 95 Nevertheless, this balancing is another departure from the rigid constraints of the employment-at-will doctrine and demonstrates that the Congress and courts are willing to protect
employees against arbitrary dismissal. In fact, interpretation of the Civil
Service Act reveals a judicial attitude of broadening or giving liberal interpretation to the protection afforded by the statute. Moreover, the federal
courts have explicitly discussed the concept of a job property right, when
91. Id § 7513. Employees removed based on this criterion are also to be afforded due process in terms of notice and a hearing. Id § 7513(b).
92. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Dischargea/Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 942, 945 (1976).
93. See supra notes 90 & 91. The existence of such procedures have led the United States
Supreme Court to hold in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) that civil servants are given a
property interest in their jobs by the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1948, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1976), a
property interest that cannot be taken away without constitutionally imposed procedures, 416
U.S. at 167. Justices Powell, White and Marshall maintained that it was up to the legislature to
grant such a property right, but that once the right was granted, it had constitutional protection.
Id These justices found that such a right had been granted, in the words regarding removal based
only on "cause." Id at 185.
94. See, ag., Greenway v. United States, 163 Ct. CI. 72, 81 (1963) (the court recognized that a
charge of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or maliciousness presents a different situation); Bilanow v.
United States, 309 F.2d 267 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (reduction-in-force case where it was held that the cutoff date had been arbitrarily fixed); Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 127 (Ct. Cl. 1948)
(courts have power to review and set aside discretionary administrative decisions regarding employee dismissal if they are arbitrary or capricious or rendered in bad faith).
95. Comment, Towards a Froperty Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 1081, 1095
(1973). This policy can be noted in the trend toward protection of individual rights in the security
cases of the 1950's and early 1960's. See, e.., Cafeteria Workers Union Local 743 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961) (government's right to dismissal is not as extensive as a private employers' in
that public employee could not be discharged for arbitrary or bad reason, yet notice and hearing
not required in every case); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (the court recognized that the
right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the fifth
amendment); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (the court decided that notice and hearing were required); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to due process upon discharge), aj#'d, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
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reviewing dismissals of public employees. 9 6 This Article will now discuss
the observations and arguments which have been developed by various
legal commentators concerning a public employee's interest in his job.
2. PropertyRight In Public Employment: Arguments by
Commentators
Consideration of the claim of a job property right has not been limited
to judicial opinions, but has been the subject of important commentary
such as that provided by Charles Reich in his article entitled "The New
Property." 97 In this article, Reich attempted to identify ways in which
"government largesse" has become a major source of subsistence for a
great number of people. One such area is public employment and the
analysis made of public employment can be applied to private employment as well. In describing the importance of public employment, Reich
noted that "a profession, job, or right to receive income, are the bases of
.. .[an individual's] various statuses in society, and may therefore be the
most meaningful and distinctive wealth he possesses."98 While importance
of an interest is not dispositive of the existence of a right, the importance of
an interest which is.refiected in a recognized right will be significant when
that right comes .into conflict with a claim of right made by another, such
as an employer claiming a right to discharge an employee.
In light of the increasing dependence of individuals on new forms of
wealth, Reich called attention to the relative impotence of employees
which occurs to the extent that employees lack the protection of rights in
employment and other intangible interests, which are traditionally afforded to other tangible and intangible property rights. 9 9 Reich stressed
both the importance of the workers' interests in employment which satisfies their needs and the significance of the recognition of a right in a job
96. As early as 1897, Judge Jackson held that employees have an interest in the office they
hold: "Has he [the employee] not a material interest in the possession of the office and the salary
attached to it? If he has such an interest in the offie.., is there not a right which should be

recognized and protected by the law in the employment of it?" Butler v. White, 83 F. 578, 586
(C.C.W. Va. 1897), rev'dsubn=m. White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 379 (1898). Justice Harlan, dissenting
in Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1899), remarked: "Apart from every
other consideration, the right to receive and enjoy the salary attached to such an office isa right of
property... unless we mean to play with words, and regard form rather than substance." Id at

602 (emphasis added).
These statements seem to constitute the start of a trend towards a recognition by the courts of
a "property" right within the meaning of the fifth amendment. This trend was evident in Justice
Brennan's comment that employees have "an interest of sufficient definiteness to be protected by
the federal constitution from some kinds of governmental injury." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899-900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality
of the Lloyd-La Folette Act of 1948, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1979), which guarantees that civil service
employees should be removed only for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,"
but making a hearing only discretionary. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stewart, wrote a plurality opinion upholding the law, based on the argument that "the

property interest which appellee [the employee] had in his employment was itself conditioned by
procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest." Id at 155. See infra
notes 102-16 and accompanying text.
97. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE LJ.733 (1964).

98. Id at 738, 739.
99. Id at 737.
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which involves a right to a status.' ° Such a right, according to Reich,
should be viewed as property and should receive legal recognition and
protection as do other property rights. Reich argued that in modem society, status is important not only to a sense of identity but also to an ability
to provide for one's needs. Thus, laws which have been formulated to protect one's sense of integrity and identity should be extended to statuses
which provide the basis for earning the means of a livelihood. 10 1 One of

the most important status relationships of a person in contemporary society is that of employee, and thus it is proper for the law to extend protection to the preservation of this status.
Courts have, in the two decades since the publication of Reich's article, begun to consider the asserted claim of a property right in one's job.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court discussed the issue of job entitlement in two decisions involving wrongful discharges of public employees.10 2 In Perry v. Sindermann, 0 3 the Court accepted a state junior college
professor's contention that he had been denied procedural due process by
the failure of the college to grant him a hearing before deciding not to
renew his teaching contract.1 4 Accepting the proposition that no hearing
is required unless there has been .a deprivation of "liberty" or "property,"
the Court held that in this case the professor had to be given the opportunity to prove such a deprivation. 10 5 Although state law did not authorize
the college explicitly to grant tenure, the Court reasoned that the existence
of a de facto tenure policy, "the equivalent of tenure" which created an
expectancy of continual employment, may be a sufficient "liberty" or
"property" interest to require a hearing before dismissal. 10 6 The Court
recognized that there was a possibility of Sindermann establishing a property interest in job tenure. 10 7 Moreover, the Court directly compared the
use of an implied contract analysis in the university context to its previously adopted position that collective bargaining arguments in private industry may be supplemented by "the common law of a . . .particular
plant."10 8 This analysis suggested that the Court might be willing to look
at an entire employment picture in a particular case, whether public or
private employment, in terms of an implicit property interest of a job
holder.
100. Id at 738-39.
101. Id at 785.
102. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972). See generally Comment, Due Processand the Non TenuredProfessor: A Comment on Roth
andPeny,8 GONZ. L. REv.99 (1972); Board ofRegents v. Roth: ProceduralRights of Non-Tenured Teachers, 73 COLUM. L. Rnv. 882 (1973).

103. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
104. Id at 597-98.
105. Id at 601-03. The Court affirmed Sindermann's right, upon proof of a property interest
to a hearing on his first amendment claim and on the issue of violation of rights under the college's informal job security system. Id
106. Id The Court noted the possibility of an employee establishing "the existence of rules
and understanding, promulgated and fostered by state officials, that... [would] justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent 'sufficient cause.'" Id at 602.
107. Id at 602-03.

108. Id at 602 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960)).
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In the companion case of Boardof Regents v. Roth, 10 9 however, the
Court found no basis for the claim of a non-tenured assistant professor to a
hearing before the state university declined to renew his contract. The
Roth opinion reiterated the proposition that unless a "liberty" or "property" interest was at stake, a hearing was not required. The majority opinion stated that "to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or a desire for it;" property interests
are "created and. . . defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."' 10 Unlike Perry, the Roth
Court found no independent source of a property right, such as contact
terms or past custom, and therefore no property interest was found."'
An apparent difficulty in establishing a property interest in one's job
can be observed in Bishop v. Wood 1 2 which seems to depart from the
Perry and Roth holdings. This case involved a chief of police who had
been employed under an ordinance classifying him as a "permanent employee.""l 3 The police chief challenged his discharge from employment
without a hearing."l 4 Despite the explicit contractual language, the Court
agreed with the trial judge's decision that the chief of police held his job at
the pleasure of the city and, therefore, that he did not have a property
interest which could be protected by due process." 5 The Court did not
follow the analysis outlined in Perry since it did not look at the circumstances surrounding the employment relationship. Instead, the Court used
a narrow reading of Roth to determine the existence of property rights.
The Court looked solely to state law rather than the totality of the circumstances surrounding the employment relationship which includes such "independent 6sources as state law and the terms of the employment
contract.""1
The Court's holding in Bishop may be justifiable for several reasons.
Although the language of the contract in Bishop provided an apparently
absolute claim to "permanent employment," the contract departed from a
conventional analysis of rights which views them as restricted by the conflicting rights of employers to dismiss for cause. Moreover, the political
nature of the office of police chief provides a further basis for distinguishing this case from that of a more conventional employee. It seems clear,
however, that this line of cases clearly establishes the proposition that the
one's job where such a right is explicCourt will recognize a right to retain
7
itly established by state statutes.' '
109. 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972).
110. Id at 577.

111. Id at 577-79.
112. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).

113. Id at 343.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id
Id at 349-50.
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
The Roth and Sindermann decisions have been used in two recent cases as the basis for

the proposition that the plaintiffs did not have a property interest in their jobs. In Wotten v.
Clifton Forge School Bd., 655 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1981), the court concluded that the plaintiff had

not shown a property interest in employment under either his contract or state law. Id at 554-55.

In Ogilbee v. Western District Guidance Center, Inc., 658 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1981), the court held
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This brief consideration of federal legislative developments and judicial interpretation of legislation in the field of employment leads to the
conclusion that Congress has departed from the rigidity of the employment-at-will doctrine. Moreover, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of Congressional legislation protecting employees. The courts have
found a property interest in employment when such a right is clearly established by statute, and even where there is a "valid" expectancy in continued employment.
3. State Statutory Developments
There are various state legislative enactments which offer substantial
protections to employees from abusive employers. For instance, a number
of states have specifically provided protection from employer reprisal
against employees who file workmen's compensation claims. 118 These
statutes are consistent with independent judicial decisions providing such
protection. 19 Also, several states have made it a crime for employers to
coerce their employees into engaging or refraining from certain political
activities. 120 Most of these statutes, however, do not provide specific civil
remedies for the wronged employees. Additionally, many states have
passed legislation that prohibits the use of lie detectors or stress evaluation
tests as a condition for or continued employment. 12' These statutes have
been given broadened significance as a result of liberal judicial construction. 122 Finally, an important state enactment is the Michigan "whistle
blower" statute which aims to protect employees who report to governmental officials or make known to the public the illegal and other socially
harmful or abusive activities of their employers.1 23 This statute provides
protection apparently "navailable under common law; the ramification of
this type of legislation will be discussed more fully later in this Article. 124
These state enactments provide a sound precedent for establishing broader
protection for employees' rights in their job by the adoption of specific
legislation so .providing.
C. JudicialModjfcations
This Article has sought to identify the scope and breadth of legislative
coverage afforded to employees against the totally discretionary dismissal
that since the plaintiff alleged no facts indicating that his employment was not an at will employment and had not identified any implicit or explicit provision in his contract that would indicate
his entitlement under state law to continued employment, he could not implicate a protected property interest. d at 260.
118. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-379 (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48,

§ 138.4(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1979).

119. See infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
120. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE 1102 (West 1971). See generally 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1:48

(198 1) (gives a complete list of these states).

121. See, eg., CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.2 (West 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.3 (West Supp.

1982); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2205(2) (West Supp. 1980); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.225, -.227

(1981).
122. See infra notes 165, 168.
123. MftCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361 to -.362 (West 1981).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 150-200.
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power which employers enjoyed under the employment-at-will doctrine.
Moreover, it has indicated judicial recognition of a need to limit the doctrine by recognizing the fundamental role employment plays in the lives of
contemporary Americans, and that a right to one's job under certain circumstances should be recognized and be given judicial protection. 125
Commentators continue to urge courts to adopt such a posture and to recognize that continued maintenance of the doctrine of employment-at-will
is unfair in light of today's economic realities.12 6 Attention will now be
directed to the various courts' decisions considering the employment-atwill doctrine including those which adopt a departure from the rule in
order to protect wrongfully dismissed employees. Additionally there will
be a discussion of decisions which continue to uphold the employment-atwill doctrine on the basis of traditional contract analysis.
1. Public Policy Exception
The theory most widely adopted by courts in recent years to carve out
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine is that employers should not
be allowed to terminate employees for reasons which are clear violations
of some established public policy. 127 Nevertheless, the concept of public
policy is by its nature nebulous and difficult to define or interpret.' 2 8 One
state court review of the history and content of the public policy concept
suggested difficulty in defining and limiting it.129 It was observed by this
court that the classical formulation of the public policy doctrine was set
out as that "principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the
public good;" 1 30 however, it was observed that beyond this relatively indeterminate description of the doctrine, jurists3 had been unable to fashion a
very workable definition of public policy.' 1
An early decision involving the public policy limitation was rendered
by the California Court of Appeals in the case of Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters.132 In Petermann, a former business agent
of the Teamsters Union brought a wrongful discharge suit against his employer-union, alleging that he had been fired because of his refusal to com125. See, eg., infra notes 172, 184 & 216.
126. See, eg., Blades, supra note 2, at 1416; Peck, Unjust DischargefromEmployment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. LJ.1,42-46 (1979); Note, supra note 46, at 1828-29; Note,
supra note 58, at 767-69; Comment, Recognizing the Employee'r Interest in ContinuedEmployment--the CaifforniaCause of 4ctionfor Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAC. L.J. 69, 95-96 (1980).
127. See Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
2d 24, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
P.2d 25 (1959); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 82 Ill.
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
128. Blackburn, RestrictedEmployerDischargeRights: 4 Changing Conceptof/Employment at
Will, 17 AM. Bus. L. J. 467, 473 (1980). See also Olsen, Wrongful DischargeClainsRaisedby at
Will Employees: A New Legal ConcernforEmployees, 32 LAB. L.J. 265, 268-78 (1981).
129. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282
Md. 588, 605-07, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228-29 (1978).
130. Id at 605, 386 A.2d at 1228 (citing Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L. Cas. 196 (1853)).
131. Id.
132. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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mit perjury at his employer's request.1 33 The court held that Petermann
had stated a claim for relief and that the considerations of public policy
might limit the employer's right to discharge. 134 The court observed that it
would be odious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy
to permit an employer to discharge any employee on the grounds that the
employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute. 135 The court reasoned that continued employment made contingent
upon commission of a felonious act at the instance of an employer "would
be to encourage criminal conduct" and "would be patently contrary to the
public welfare."' 136 For almost a decade, the California court stood alone
in its recognition of rights of employees to protection from at will discharge. 137 Since the early 1970's, however, a number of courts have
adopted the public policy theory as a bar against abusive discharges, and
more generally as a means of reducing the inequities of the employmentat-will rule.' 3 8 Nevertheless, other courts have not adopted such a public
have
policy limitation on an employer's right to dismiss an employee and
39
upheld the traditional common law employment-at-will doctrine.'
a. Workmen's Compensation Cases
One frequently litigated employment-related right is an employee's
right to seek and receive workmen's compensation. In a 1973 landmark
decision, Frampton v. CentralIndiana Gas Co. ,140 the Supreme Court of
Indiana held that a discharged employee had alleged a sufficient legal
claim for relief when she contended that she was discharged by the defendant without reason, one month after she obtained a settlement of a workmen's compensation claim. The court based its decision upon a state
statute which provided that no "device" would operate to relieve an employer from any obligation under the state workmen's compensation
code. 14 1 The court held that a discharge or a threat of discharge is such an
unlawful device. 142 The court went on to observe that permitting employers to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims,
would undermine an important public policy because fear of being dis133. Id at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
134. Id at 188-90, 344 P.2d at 27-28.

135. Id at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
136. Id at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.

137. See Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 795, 13 Cal. Rptr.
769, 771 (1961).
138. See, eg., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Keneally v.
Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980). See

generally infra text accompanying notes 144-221.
139. See, ag., Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959); Lekich v. International

Business Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Kelsay v.

Motorola Inc., 74 Il.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Ohio Table Pad Co. of Indiana v. Hogan, -

Ind. App. -, 424 N.E.2d 144 (1981); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327

(1980).
140. 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973).
141. Id at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28. See IND. ANN. STAT.

142. 260 Ind. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428.

§ 40-1215

(1965).
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charged would discourage exercise of this statutory right.1 43 Thus, both
public policy considerations and an explicit right to maintain a workmen's
compensation claim gave rise to limitations on an employer's right to dismiss an employee and gave implicit recognition to an employee's right to
retain his or her job absent good cause providing a basis for dismissal.
While some courts have reached the same conclusion as the Frampton
court because of clear state statutes prohibiting discharges in retaliation for
the filing of workmen's compensation claims, 144 other courts have adopted
the same theory in the absence of statutes similar to the Indiana statute.1 45
For example, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. ,146 the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized a tort action against an employer who discharged an employee
in retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation claim, even though the
state workmen's compensation act did not specifically provide for civil
remedies for retaliatory discharges. 147 The court held that the termination,
if allowed to stand, would contravene established public policy, and the
court maintained that the workmen's compensation program would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to
terminate by threatening
to discharge employees for seeking compensation
148
under the act.
In Kelsay, the Illinois Supreme Court carved out a new exception to
the common law termination-at-will doctrine. 14 9 This decision constitutes
an important step towards judicially providing some measure ofjob security protection for employees who do not have sufficient bargaining power
to protect themselves from such discharge. The Kelsay decision gives important recognition to the existence of exceptions to the at-will doctrine
which are necessitated by specific compelling circumstances.
The cases discussed in this section provide significant protection
against discharges prompted by an employer's desire to retaliate against an
employee exercising a specific right, fulfilling a legally-imposed duty, or
refusing to perform an unlawful act. Also, these cases provide a basis for
civil recovery against employers making such abusive discharges by recognizing the appropriateness of relief including enforcement of claims to reinstatement. To the extent that employers are thus prohibited from
143. Id at 251-52, 297 N.E.2d at 427. The court noted the obvious danger of such penalization resulting in discouragement of valid claims with the result that the statutory right would
become a nullity: "Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensation-opting, instead, to continue their employment without incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation." Id
144. See, eg., Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 NJ. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980); Lo Dolce v.
Regional Transit Serv., Inc., 77 A.D.2d 697, 429 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980); AJ. Foyt Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 578 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
145. But see Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978). Accord
Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026
(Ind. App. 1979); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Iowa 1978).
146. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
147. Id at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.
148. Id
149. Accord Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). See generaly Note, Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc. - Illinois Courts Welcome RetaliatoryDischargeSuits Under the Workmen's CompensationAct, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 839.
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dismissing employees on bases which are found to contravene public policy, the right to dismiss at will is explicitly limited. Given these limitations
the courts have implicitly recognized employees' right to retain their jobs
absent a just cause basis for dismissal.
b. ProfessionalResponsibility: "Whistle Blower" Cases
Courts have attempted the difficult task of striking a balance between
the employer's independence of action and the employee's claim of right.
This balancing is particularly difficult in those cases where dismissed employees claim that their termination resulted from their efforts at protecting the public interest at the peril of their own job security. 5 0
In Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,151 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the claim of a steel salesman that he was maliciously
discharged for pointing out to his superiors the unsafe nature of tubular
products sold to the oil and gas industry. When Geary's immediate superior was not responsive to Geary's efforts, Geary presented his misgivings
to the vice-president in charge of the product's sales.' 5 2 Apparently the
management recognized the dangerousness of the product because it was
later withdrawn from the market.15 3 Nevertheless, Geary was discharged
and the state court recognized no right of redress for him. 154 Geary contended that he made his remarks for the public good, therefore he should
be recompensed for his discharge.1 55 Unpersuaded, the court responded to
Geary's public policy argument by remarking that "the praiseworthiness .of
Geary's motive does not detract from the company's legitimate interest in
preserving its normal operational procedures from disruption."1 56 The
court apparently felt that the impact of recognizing the claimed tort of
abusive discharge on these facts would adversely affect corporate organiza157
tional procedures.
The Geary court attempted to assimilate the problem of "whistle
blowers" into the general public policy doctrine discussed above.1 58 Accordingly, only when dismissal is for complaints or public statements that
parallel recognized state policy would an employee obtain protection in his
150. See, ag., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(recognizing tort action for wrongful discharge where plaintiff-employee fired because of attempts
to have employer comply with state law); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417
A.2d 505 (1980) (recognizing a need for a balance between the interests of the employees in know-

ing that they would not be discharged for exercising their legal rights and those of the employers
in running their businesses as they saw fit).
151. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).

152. Id at 173, 319 A.2d at 175.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at

173-74, 319 A.2d at 176.
180, 319 A.2d at 178.
181, 319 A.2d at 178-79.
183, 319 A.2d at 180.
184-85, 319 A.2d at 180. The court recognized that there might be areas of an

employee's life in which an employer has no legitimate interest; moreover, the state might extend
protection to an employee in such areas as a matter of public policy. Id However, absent a
showing of a clear mandate of public policy protection along with the establishment of a legitimately protected interest, the court refused to recognize any. legal basis for wrongful discharge.
Id
158. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
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continued employment. A strong dissent, however, was written in Geary
stating that it was shocking that "today's jurisprudence is so lacking in
awareness and vitality that our judicial process is incapable of affording
relief to a responsible employee for an arbitrary and retaliatory discharge
from employment."1 59 The dissent maintained that the public interest was
served by Geary's action and that the law should give recognition to a
right of redress in the form of a tort action for abusive discharge.160
A similar public policy approach was taken by the Eighth Circuit in
Percival v. General Motors Corp. 161 The complainant was an executive
engineer for General Motors from 1947 to 1973.162 At the time of his termination he was head of the company's mechanical development department. 163 He alleged that he was discharged for refusing to give the
government false information at the behest of his employer, for undertaking to correct certain alleged misrepresentations made to the government,
and for legitimately complaining about certain of General Motor's allegedly deceptive practices.1l 4 In sustaining the trial court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the employer, the Eighth Circuit adopted a
balancing approach, weighing arguments for an employer's right to discharge against arguments for recognizing a claim of right in an employee's
job.165 The court concluded that here such a balance should be struck in
favor of the employer.1 66 The court observed that while there were strong
policy arguments that could be made in support of protecting the employee's job, there were also strong policy arguments that could be made
against it.167 The court stressed a large corporation's need to have latitude
in determining who will occupy "high and sensitive managerial positions."' 168 The approach in this case, similar to that taken in Geary, emphasizes the importance of the terminable-at-will rule to the independence
of employers. These decisions are founded on the employment-at-will
doctrine, and evidence the reluctance of courts to act unilaterally in abandoning it. While these holdings do not depart from the traditional employment-at-will doctrine, the courts issuing these decisions do seem to be
prepared to recognize an exception to the rule based on a finding that an
has acted in furtherance of a public policy mandated by
employee
169
statute.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

456 Pa. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180-81.
Id at 190-94, 319 A.2d at 183-85.
539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id at 1127.
Id
Id at 1128.
Id at 1130.

166. Id
167. I.d
168. Id Despite its narrow definition of public policy, the Percival decision may be justified
on its facts. It should be noted that Percival did not prove that he was fired. Percival v. General
Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1323-24 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aft'd, 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976).

There was substantial evidence tending to prove that he resigned after disagreement with General
Motors and that the suit may have been brought to uncover the alleged misdeeds of General
Motors rather than to prosecute a wrongful discharge claim. Id at 1324.
169. In a footnote in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), the
court commented that its decision did not necessarily reject other court decisions based on a statu-
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These two cases represent the increasing number of alleged wrongful
discharge cases where private sector, at-will-employees, have been discharged for "blowing the whistle" on their employers.1 70 These cases almost invariably follow a general pattern: The employee objects to work
that he or she believes is violative of state or federal law or otherwise improper as against the public interest. Based on this objection, the employee expresses his intention not to assist the employer in furtherance of
such work and generally protests that such work should not be performed.
Finally, in some cases, the "responsible" employee engages in certain activities outside the workplace to halt the work such as complaining to public officials or providing information to others who disclose the practices to
the public. 17 1 Because of this behavior, the employer discharges or demotes the employee for either refusal to work or incompatibility with
management.
Illustration of such a scenario may be found in Pierce v. Ortho
PharmaecuticalCorp. 172 In this case, Dr. Grace Pierce, who was director
of medical research in charge of therapeutic drugs at Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., differed with the management of the corporation on the proposed testing of loperamide, a new liquid treatment for acute and chronic
diarrhea in children and the aged. 173 Dr. Pierce, the only physician on the
research team, refused to approve the testing of this new drug on children
because of the excessively high concentration of saccharin it contained
which posed a potential health hazard to the children on whom the drug
was tested. 7 4 She claimed her refusal was justified by the Hippocratic
Oath.175 Following her refusal, Dr. Pierce was removed from the project,
demoted, and told that she was considered unpromotable. t76 As a consetorily based public policy: "It is not necessary to reject the rationale of these decisions in order to
defend the result we reach here. In each case where a cause of action was found, the mandates of

public policy were clear and compelling; that cannot be said of the instant case." Id at 184 n.16,
319 A.2d at 180 n.16. See also Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Irontown R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App.

489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), where the court: "[Riecognized exceptions to the well established
rule that at will employment contracts are terminable at any time for any reason by either party.
These exceptions were created to prevent individuals from contravening the public policy of this
state." Id at 492,265 N.W.2d at 388. See generally Blackburn,supra note 128, at 477; Glendon &
Lev, supra note 32, at 468.
170. See, eg., McNulty v. Borden, 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (the court held that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action for wrongful dismissal because he alleged that his discharge
was caused by his refusal to acquiesce to special pricing arrangements in violation of the Clayton
Act); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980)
(the Supreme Court of California held, that the plaintiff had a cause of action for wrongful discharge for allegedly being fired for not participating in a price-fixing scheme); Harless v. First
Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (the court held that the public policy exception applied
to the plaintiff who was discharged because of his attempts to protect borrowers from the bank's
violation of the Consumer Credit and Protection Act). See generally Olsen, supra note 128, at 275;
Comment, Protectingthe PrivateSector at Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle"s A Cause of
Action Based Upon Determinantsof Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REv.777, 799.
171. See Walters, Your Employee's Right to Blow the Whistle, 55 HARV. Bus. REv. 26, 33
(July-Aug. 1975); see also Cook, Whistle Blowers Friend or Foe?, INDUSTRY WEEK 51 (Oct. 5,
1981).
172. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
173. Id at 62-63, 417 A.2d at 506-07.
174. Id at 63, 417 A.2d at 507.
175. Id
176. Id
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quence, she tendered her resignation and instituted suit against her former
employer.1 77 In deciding the case, the New Jersey Supreme Court took a
radical departure from the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. 178 The
Pierce court held that:
[A]n employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the
discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. The
sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a
professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy. . . . Absent legislation, the judiciary must define the cause of
action in case-by-case determinations. An employer's right to discharge an employee-at-will carries a correlative duty not to discharge
would require a
an employee who declines to perform an act17that
9
violation of a clear mandate of public policy.
The Pierce decision is significant in several respects: (1) it abrogated
the long-standing common law rule that an employer has an absolute right
to discharge with impunity on the basis of the employment-at-will rule; 80
(2) it broadened the concept of public policy to include the substantive
provisions of professional codes of ethics;' 8 ' (3) it expressly recognized
that professionals "owe a special duty" to uphold the codes of ethics of
their professions, as well as federal and state law, and that they may, on
occasion, be obliged to refuse to perform acts required of them by their
employers;' 8 2 and (4) it adopted a balancing approach in which the interests of the employer, the employee and the general public were equally
83
weighed with the result that the public interest became determinative.1
Similarly, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,184 the California
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a so-called "whistle blowing" employee
by concentrating on the elements of the employment relationship and the
proper scope of the employee's power. The court held that the plaintiff
had sufficiently alleged a wrongful discharge tort claim when he contended
that he was fired after fifteen years of satisfactory job performance because
he refused to take part in alleged price fixing violations prohibited by the
177. Id at 64, 417 A.2d at 508.
178. Id Butsee e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (employee's
allegation that she was discharged after refusing to falsify medical records does not justify the
creation of a new tort based on public policy as an exception to the at will rule); Campbell v. Eli
Lilly & Co., - Ind. App. -, -, 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (1980) (court denied plaintiff recovery for
dismissal allegedly related to plaintifi's questioning of his employer's practices regarding the
safety of some drugs and irregularities in filing with the FDA, deferring to the "venerable" at will
employment doctrine).
179. 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
180. Id at 72, 75, 417 A.2d at 512, 514.
181. Id at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
182. Id at 71, 417 A.2d at 512.
183. Id at 71, 417 A.2d at 511. See also O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 418, 390
A.2d 149; 150 (1978) (X-ray technician's dismissal for refusal to perform an illegal act was improper); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 389 (1980)
(dismissal of an at-will employee in retaliation for his insistance that the employer comply with a
state law governing the labeling and licensing of the employer's products was improper and supported a tort action because an employee should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal
sanction or to jeopardize his continued employment).
184. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980).
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Sherman Act and the California antitrust statute. 185 Consistent with
Petermann,186 the California court held that an employer cannot claim a
right to order an employee to engage in criminal conduct, and concomitantly an employer cannot try to coerce an employee to engage in such
conduct under a threat of discharge; where an employer attempts such coercion and discharges a noncomplying employee, that employee may
maintain an action for wrongful discharge and establish a claim for damages. 187 In support of its holding, the court acknowledged the recent trend
recognizing "a common law tort action for wrongful
discharge in cases in
188
which the termination contravenes public policy."'
Most recently, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Adler v. American Standard Corp.189 Adler claimed that he was discharged by the defendant after an investigation he conducted had uncovered various
financial improprieties in the corporate employer's operation.190 The court
held that Maryland recognizes "a cause of action for abusive discharge by
an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge
contravenes some clear mandate of public policy."' 19 1 The court, however,
concluded that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient factual support for
such a violation of public policy in this case.' 92 Nevertheless, this case
suggests that an alternate rationale which leads to a modification of the
employment-at-will doctrine, is a finding that public policy which lies at
the foundation of the doctrine has come to require its modification because
of an employer's abuse of the power to discharge. Public interests are
served by limiting the employer's discharge power and ultimately public
policy requires the recognition of the employee's claim on his or her job.
Nevertheless, the "whistle blower" cases may be rationalized as nothing
more than an outgrowth of the rule enunciated long ago in Petermann, that
an employee should not be forced to choose between the loss of employ93
ment and the commission of an illegal act to benefit his employer.
Today the climate for "whistle blowers" is more favorable than it was
a decade ago. 194 To a certain extent this new concern with the employee's
freedom reflects a recognition of a need to publicly disclose complaints
and critical observations of those who are in a position to observe abuse
and wrongdoing. As a practical matter this means that employees must be
permitted, if not encouraged, to reveal such abuses. One commentator
suggests that the protection aspect will be less of a motivating factor than
185. Id at 178, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846, 610 P.2d at 1336-37.

186. 174 CaL App. 2d 184,344 P.2d 25 (1959). See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

27 Cal. 3d at 178, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846, 610 P.2d at 1336-37.
Id at 178, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845, 610 P.2d at 1336.
291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
Id at 34, 432 A.2d at 466.
Id at 47, 432 A.2d at 473. Accord Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W.

Va. 1978) (allegations by former manager of defendant's consumer credit department of employer's intentional and illegal violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act
supported plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful discharge because of a clear public policy to

protect borrowers under the Act).
192. 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 472-73.

193. See supra notes 127, 132-37 and accompanying text.
194. One business commentator predicts that "the 1980's will be a decade of employee rights"
and that whistle blowing will lead the way. Cook, supra note 171, at 52.
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the employee's conscience, and that in fact many companies no longer
consider retribution a management tool.195 Presently, there is no federal
legislation providing relief for discharge following an employee's disclosure of an employer's wrongdoing. State legislation, however, has been
enacted and a model for such legislation is provided by the Michigan
Whistle Blower's Protection Act. 196 This statute makes it illegal for a
Michigan employer to discharge, threaten, or discriminate against an employee who "reports or is about to report" a suspected violation of federal,
state or local law to a public body. 197 The statute further provides that an
employee who believes he or she has been the victim of retribution can file
a claim in court within a ninety day period' 9 8 and upon a finding of such
wrongful discharge, a court can reinstatethe worker with backpay199 The
law does not provide protection for employees who make claims which
they know to be false or where allegations do not involve a violation of the
law.20 " While courts can independently develop such protection, a more
effective and satisfactory approach vindicating the public interest and providing needed job security is provided by this type of legislation.
c. Other Public Policy Cases
In addition to the public policy areas already discussed, some employees have invoked a broad public policy exception to the at-will rule and
have convinced a minority of courts that such protection is required by
public policy in the construction of various statutes and in the interpretation of prior judicial opinions. This potpouri of public policy exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine will be discussed in the remainder of this
section of this Article.
One legal duty which has been relied upon by the courts to create a
public policy exception is jury service. The leading case in this area is Nees
v. Hocks 20 1 decided by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1975. Here, the
plaintiff contended that she was discharged by her former employer because she willingly performed jury duty.20 2 The court held that the plaintiff could recover compensatory damages, including damages for
emotional distress, because her discharge violated public policy against
discharge for "a socially undesirable motive" such as discouraging jury
duty.20 3 The court found that the jury system would be adversely affected
if employees could be freely discharged for serving on jury duty.2°4
195. See generally A. WESTIN, WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DIssENT IN THE CoRPORATION (1981).
196. MICH. COMp. LAWS. ANN. §§ 15.361 to .364 (1981).
197. Id § 15.362.

198. Id § 15.363.
199. Id § 15.364.
200. Id § 15.362.

201.
202.
203.
204.

272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
Id at 211-12, 536 P.2d at 512-13.
Id at 218, 536 P.2d at 515.
Id at 219, 536 P.2d at 516. See also Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super.

Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). Some jurisdictions have statutorily created causes of action to protect

employees who are dismissed for serving on a jury. See, eg, COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-71-118(1)

(1973).
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While a clear showing of public interest in an employee's activity may
result in a limitation on an employer's power to discharge, to the extent
that such public interest is merely parasitic on an employee's assertion of a
personal interest in conflict with an employer's interest in discharging the
employee, public interest may be insufficient to override the presumption
created in favor of the employer's power to discharge which follows from
the employment-at-will doctrine. The limited extent of the protection afforded to employees by the public policy exception is illustrated by a decision rendered by the same court which decided Nees. In Campbell v. Ford
Industries,Inc.,205 the plaintiff, Albert Campbell, was a stockholder of the
company as well as a former employee. Campbell alleged that he had
requested certain corporate information from Ford regarding the value of
its stock, and had further sought to discover whether the management had
engaged in any corporate misdealings.20 6 After his inquiry Campbell was
terminated. 20 7 The Oregon court ruled against the plaintiff and reconciled
its holding in Nees by distinguishing between the public and private interests involved in the termination of an at-will employee. The court reasoned that Campbell's motives in seeking information about the
corporation were based primarily on his private proprietary interests and
not the advancement of public policy.208 Campbell's demands, the court
concluded, were part of his rights as a stockholder and did not have a
sufficiently direct relation to any corresponding public interest or to his
interests in his job. 209 This latter point may be significant in limiting this
case to its facts. Where, however, the employee can broaden the basis of
his action from mere shareholder to that of employee-shareholder by
showing that his claim arises from a status based on stock bonuses, stock
options, or stock participation, it can be argued that the employee has established a protected status from which he has asserted his rights. Campbell's attack on his dismissal then implicitly raises the issue of whether an
employer should be able to terminate an employee who also has the status
of a stockholder as a consequence of his employment and who asserts
stockholder's rights which are regarded as hostile by the employer.
The special significance of public policy considerations in affording
job security to employees by state statutory schemes is represented by cases
which have dealt with dismissal of employees who refuse to submit to polygraph testing. Recognition of the importance of such protection of job
security is represented by Perks v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.210 In
Perks, the plaintiff refused to take a polygraph test during the course of an
investigation of charges that he had accepted gifts from company suppli205. 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
206. Id at 246-47, 546 P.2d at 144.
207. Id at 247, 546 P.2d at 144.
208. Id at 249-50, 546 P.2d at 145-46.
209. Id at 250-51, 546 P.2d at 146. See also Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho
330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Scroghan v. Krafco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977); Kencally v.
Orgain, -

Mont. -,

606 P.2d 127 (1980).

210. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Hermann, Privacy, the ProspectiveEmployee, and
Employment Testing: The Needto Restrictfolygraph andPersonalityTesting, 47 WASH. L. Rv. 73
(1971).
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ers.2 11 Subsequently, Perks was fired for violating company policy regarding receipt of gifts from suppliers. 2 12 The court held that there was
sufficient evidence indicating that the plaintiff had been discharged for his
refusal to take the polygraph examination.2 1 3 Relying upon a state statute
which declares employers guilty of a second degree misdemeanor for requiring their employees to undergo a polygraph test as a condition for employment or continuation of employment, 2 14 the court held that state
be contravened if the employer were permitted to dispublic policy would2 15
miss the employee.
While the public policy analysis has been developed as a principal
limitation on the employment-at-will doctrine, two observations are in order. First, an ambiguity exists whether the policy at issue is one which has
been adopted to provide the employee with job security or whether it involves a policy to provide an incentive or at least a removal of disincentive
to an employee to act in the public interest or to make information at his
disposal available to the public. A second issue is the inherent ambiguity
as to the source of the public policy exception, whether it is implicit in the
law's general interest to protect the public or whether it must be rooted in
some specific statute providing the public with protection. This uncertainty as to required source gives the courts difficulty in providing explicit
application based on public policy interests.
A recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court illustrates the courts
difficulty in applying the public policy exception. 2 16 In Palmateerv. InternationalHarvesterCo. ,217 the plaintiff alleged that he had been dismissed
after supplying local law enforcement authorities with information as to
possible criminal activities by another of the defendant's employees and
2 18
agreeing to assist in the investigation and trial of the other employee.
The court recognized that "the Achilles heel of the [public policy] principle
lies in the definition of public policy," 21 9 because there is no specific anthe question of "what constitutes clearly mandated public polswer'2 to
icy." 20 The court concluded that there is no public policy more important
to our society than enforcement of a state's criminal code and the effective
protection of its citizens and their property.221 Based on this rationale, the
that Palmateer had stated a cause of action for retaliatory
court declared
222
discharge.
The Palmateercase reaches a new plateau in the analysis of the public
policy exception because it did not find the source of the public policy in a
211. 611 F.2d at 1364.
212. Id

213.
214.
215.
1977).
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id at 1366.
Id at 1365.
Id at 1366. Contra Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App.
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlL 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
Id
Id at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
Id at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
Id
Id at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
Id at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
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statutory provision, but rather found its content implicit in the general law
and emanating from the best interests of the citizenry. Palmateer, therefore, constitutes a radical departure from the employment-at-will doctrine
because it establishes a definite barrier to the employer's absolute discretion in dismissing the employee. The Palmateer court observed that the
law is weak if it allows employers to retaliate against employees who aid in
enforcement of the law.22 3 The limitation of the employer's power to terminate an employee was found not in a specific statutory grant of protection, but in the needs of the law generally to provide protection to the
public.
2. Contract-BasedExceptions
The above analysis of the public policy exception to the employmentat-will doctrine indicates that most courts consider the notion of the public
policy concept as limited to a narrow range of cases where the courts determine that there has been an abusive discharge in a termination case. The
restricted public policy concept also indicates the very constricted recognition of an employee's right to an interest in job retention. Most courts
adopting the public policy exception, consider the paradigm case where an
employer discharges an employee for engaging in some socially protected
activity, preferably one that has legislative sanction or support. 224 As a
result of these limitations, employees characterized as at-will employees,
who seek recovery in wrongful dismissal cases, must develop other legal
bases for their job retention claim. An alternative to this approach, a contract theory, may provide an225
independent legal basis for a cause of action
to retain an individual's job.
One of the most important developments in the line of employment
contract cases is the emergence of the malice and bad faith exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.2 6 This concept was introduced in the 1974
223. Id
224. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N,E.2d 425, 427
(1973) (court said that the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act expressed a strong public policy
which could not be effectuated unless employee could exercise his right, without retribution). See
generally Blackburn, supra note 128, at 481; Olsen, supra note 128, at 277.
225. In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256

(1977), the court said that there is a remedy, in lieu of a wrongful discharge tort, under the employment contract itself because such contracts require parties to "act in good faith toward one

another." The breach of employment contract cause of action has also been used by employees
who have alleged that they have given sufficient consideration to the employer in exchange or a
definite employment contract. See Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791, 794 (Ala. 1982) (court states that

giving up employment for new employment is valuable consideration for a new contract); Ala-

bama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939) (giving up present employment by

prospective employee constitutes consideration for the new contract of employment). Contra Page
v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1157, 1158 (1982) (relinquishment of prior job insufficient to
provide consideration for lifetime contract); United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281 Ala.
264, 266, 201 So.'2d 853, 855 (1967) (day-to-day services rendered by plaintiff was insufficient to

provide consideration for indefinite employment contract).
226. In discussing this development in the state of California, one commentator remarked that
every employment contract contains "an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing

that neither party will do anything to injure the other party's right to the benefits of the agreement." Comment,supra note 126, at 92; see also W. MALLONE, supra note 69, at 572; Note, supra
note 46, at 1821.
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landmark case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 227 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury's finding
that the plaintiff, a female press machine operator, was discharged because
of her refusal to be "nice" to her foreman. 228 The court held that termination which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is
not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and
should therefore be construed to be a breach of the employment contract.229 The Monge decision does not completely abrogate the employer's
right to discharge, but importantly, the case expressly does recognize an
interest of the employee to retain his job. In attempting to strike a balance,
the Monge court attempted to provide "the employee a certain stability of
employment" and at the same time adopt a rule which "does not interfere
with the employer's normal exercise of his right to discharge, which is nec230
essary to permit him to operate his business efficiently and profitably."
This approach attempts to balance the interest of the employer to be free to
discharge where appropriate and the interest of the employee to retain his
job absent good cause for dismissal. These cases are distinguishable from
the public policy cases where the court can identify a third interest, the
general public interest, which will resolve the conflict in interest between
the employer and employee. Instead the court must resolve the competition of interests by considering the reason for discharge, and more particularly whether the employer has exercised his power to discharge in good
faith.
The powerful effect of the good faith requirement as a limitation on
the employer's freedom to discharge can be observed in Fortunev. National
Cash Register.2 t The plaintiff, Fortune, was a salesman employed under
a written at-will employment "salesman's contract" and was terminated
after almost twenty-five years of service. 232 The discharge took place one
day after a customer in Fortune's territory placed a five million dollar contract with him.23 According to the terms of the contract, Fortune would
have been entitled to a considerable sales commission absent the discharge.23 4 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
facts of the case indicated that the employer, National Cash Register
(NCR), dismissed the employee in violation of the "covenant of good
faith" contained in every contract23 5 and therefore, NCR breached the
contract of employment with Fortune. 236 The incorporation of the re227. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
228. Id at 131, 316 A.2d at 550.
229. Id at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
230. Id at 133, 316 A.2d at 552.
231. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
232. Id at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
233. Id at 98-99, 364 N.E.2d 1254.
234. Id at 97-98, 364 N.E.2d at 1253.
235. Id at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
236. Id at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. Contra Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh.2287, 2296, 429 N.E.2d 21, 28 (1981) (court declined to adopt a general rule that the discharge
of an at-will employee without cause is alone a violation of an employer's obligation of "good
faith and fair dealing"); Keneally v. Orgain, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 127 (1980) (summary judgment
granted to defendant in case where plaintiff alleged that discharge was motivated by a desire to
minimize commissions, because no public policy was involved); Feola v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 208
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quirement of good faith into the employment contract with the consequent
limiting of the employer's power to discharge reflects an implicit recognition by the court of the interest of the employee in retaining his job, and
provides a basis for establishing a qualified right of an employee to retain
his job.
In McKinney v. NationalDairy Council,237 the United States District
Court of Massachusetts applied Fortune to the facts before it, not only to
limit the power of an employer to discharge, but also to limit the employer's ability to invoke the legal limitation on lifetime contracts as a basis for voiding an employment contract. The plaintiff McKinney, claimed
that he was wrongfully terminated by the employer. 238 In 1953, McKinney
placed an advertisement in a newspaper seeking employment as a sales
representative for the rest of his working life.239 During the hiring interview, McKinney reiterated the fact that he was interested primarily in job
security rather than in salary and would be willing to forego a higher paid
position to secure a stable position. 240 The prospective employer, the National Diary Council, represented the job as meeting the applicant's expectations, and McKinney therefore, decided to join the defendant company,
thereby forfeiting the opportunity to earn an additional one thousand dollars a year with a competitor. 24 1 In December 1972, the National Diary
Council forced McKinney into "early retirement," approximately five
years prior to his projected retirement. 242 McKinney filed suit in the federal district court based on the contention that he and the defendant had
entered into an oral contract in 1953 which guaranteed his employment
until 1977.243 The jury accepted this theory and found that the defendant
breached its contract with the employee and that he was dismissed specifically because of his age. 24 4 Upon a defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the McKinney court determined that there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that McKinney and
the National Diary Council had entered into a contract that expressly provided for McKinney's employment until retirement. The court, however,
observed that this contract was within the statute of frauds and therefore
invalid,245 and that McKinney was only an employee at-will. 24 6 Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court invoked Fortune247 for the proposition
Neb. 527, 304 N.W.2d 377 (1981) (employee not entitled to receive year-end bonus although discharge occurred just one month before the end of the year); Cactus Feeders, Inc. v. Witter, 509
S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (plaintiff not entitled to recover bonus although discharge occurred just prior to payment because such a bonus is within the discretion of the employer).
237. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
238. Id at 1111.
239. The advertisement read. "interested in change which would be the third and must be the
last." Id (emphasis added).
240. Id at 1110.
241. Id
242. Id at 1109 n.1.
243. Id
244. Id at 1109.
245. Id at 1116.
246. Id at 1117.
247. Id at 1118 (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 354 N.E.2d 1251
(1977)).
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that there existed a convenant of "good faith and fair dealing with respect
to a decision to terminate the employment," 248 and the district court reasoned that the plaintiff's dismissal constituted a breach of the employment
contract. 24 9 The court concluded that under Massachusetts law, the employer's decision to terminate McKinney constituted a decision based primarily on age and that to terminate an at-will employee at the age of sixty,
after nineteen years of
service, violated the implied obligation of good
250
faith and fair dealing.
What the court did here is clear enough. In implicitly recognizing an
employee's right to employment, the court explicitly restricted the employer's freedom to terminate and at the same time abrogated the rule
against lifetime contracts. Basically the court read into the employment
contract a requirement of good faith as a limitation on the employer's
power to discharge and it did this on a public basis which implicitly recognized the right of an employee to his job. The McKinney decision goes
beyond the Fortune holding in that it restricts the employer's perogative in
managing its business and it extends the concept of "good faith dealing" to
situations where recovery is not otherwise provided for by either the terms
of the employment contract or under statutory protection. 25 1 This decision
reflects the analysis adopted in recent cases which appears to indicate a
trend in the interpretation of employment contracts which would
include
25 2
minimum standards of fairness as part of employment contract.
Potentially the most far-reaching case in limiting an employer's freedom to dismiss without good faith is Cleary v. American Airlines,Inc.25 3 In
this case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been wrongfully discharged from
his employment by the defendant company after eighteen years of satisfactory service. 254 The complaint alleged that the employee had been falsely
accused by the employer of various work rule infractions, that he was discharged in violation of the employer's personnel procedures, and that the
termination violated the implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 5 5 Rather than adopt the negative analysis of McKinney, that good
faith limited an employer's freedom to discharge, the California Court of
248. Id at 1121-22.
249. Id at 1122.
250. Id
251. This extension of Fortune inMcKinney has been recognized by commentators. See Comment, McKinney v. National Dairy Council: The Employee at Will Relationshopin Massachusetts,
16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 285 (1981), where the author observed:
The MeKinney court expanded the Fortune court's definition of bad faith by holding that
bad faith was implicated when an employer terminated an at will employee because of
his age .... The extension of Fortune was necessary if McKinney were to recover

against NDC because McKinney had neglected to satisfy the statutory requirements
which might have afforded him a remedy. Absent a statutory remedy, McKinney's only
chance of recovery was the ...approach adopted by the McKinney court.
Id at 294.
252. See Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); A. John Cohen Agency, Inc. v.
Middlesex Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 158, 392 N.E.2d 862 (1979); Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp.
of America, 391 Mass. 179, 385 N.E.2d 961 (1979); Madaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc.,
422 N.E.2d 1379 (Mass. App. 1981).
253. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
254. Id at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
255. Id at 447-48, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725, 727-28.
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Appeals adopted a positive approach which recognizes an employee's right
to his job, and which requires an employer to establish good cause before
an employee can be terminated. 25 6 The court explicitly held that an employer can only discharge a long term employee for just cause and that an
employer is liable for compensatory and punitive damages for any unjust
dismissals.2 57 The court said the termination without just cause violated
the "implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing" found in all
contracts and that the employer had a duty not to harm the employee's
position.2 58 While Cleary gives apparent recognition to the continued
existence of the at-will employment doctrine, 259 the opinion effectively
eliminates the common law rule as it has heretofore been applied to longterm employees. 2 60 Here the court has explicitly recognized the employee's expectation and interest in the right to retain his job. The very
terms used by the courts, "deprive" and "benefit," are representative of the
language of a rights analysis. Ultimately, this court's decision rests on a
recognition of the right to one's job.
As apparently innovative and direct as the Cleary opinion is, it pales
in comparison with Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,261
in which the Michigan Supreme Court found the basis for a right to one's
job on both express and implied contract terms,2 62 and that such a right
was not against public policy.2 63 In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that an employer's unilateral statement of policy could give rise
to the right to one's job in an indefinite employment context. 264 The plaintiff in this case had been employed in a middle management position with
defendant Blue Cross and was dismissed after five years of service.2 65 The
plaintiff filed suit against the employer alleging that the termination violated his employment contract which permitted discharge only for
cause.2 66 The employee-plaintiff had asked about his job security pros256.
257.
258.
259.

Id at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
Id
Id at 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
Id 4ccord Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (employee's

allegation that even though he was a model employee for 13 years, he was terminated solely to
deprive him of his pension benefits stated a cause of action for abusive discharge); Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (employee who was terminated
after 32 years of employment demonstrated aprimafaciecase of wrongful termination in violation
of the implied promise in contract of employment that employers would not act arbitrarily in
dealing with employees, as evidenced by the totality of the employment relationship).
260. The Cleary court held that "the longevity of the employee's service, together with the
expressed policy of the employer, operate as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such
an employee by the employer without good cause." Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443,456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729. Contra Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir.
1959); Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); O'Neill v. ARA
Serv., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250
S.E.2d 442 (1979); Ohio Table Pad Co., - Ind. App. -, 424 N.E.2d 144 (1981); Schwartz v.
Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471,308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Edwards v. Citibank, 74 A.D.2d
553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1980). In these cases the courts have continued to use the traditional atwill analysis and have upheld the doctrine.
261. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
262. Id at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
263. Id at 611-12, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
264. Id at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
265. Id at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
266. Id
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pects when he was first hired and the defendant-company told him that he
"would be with the company as long as [he] did [his] job."267 In addition,
the employee was given a "Blue Cross Personnel Policies Manual" which
stated that it was the "policy" of the company to terminate employees "for
just cause only." 2 68 In deciding this case, the court held that a provision of
an employment contract providing that there will not be a discharge except
for cause is a legally enforceable term even though the contract is not for a
definite term and that such protection may become part of the contract
either by express agreement, oral or written, or as "a result of an employee's
legitimate expectationsgroundedin an employer'spolicystatement. '269 The
court easily read the requirement of "for cause" dismissal into the employment contract, and simply rejected the assertion that the employer had a
right to dismiss an employee at will. The court found the limitations on
the employer's freedom to be implicit in the contract and observed that
even without a definite term in an employment contract, an employee can
obtain a binding agreement providing for job security which requires the
employer to establish cause for discharge, if when seeking employment,
the employee inquired as to job security and the employer offered a permanent job as long as the employee did a good job.270 The court concluded that under such circumstance, an employee who is discharged
without good or just cause, may maintain an action for wrongful discharge. 27 1 Moreover, in analyzing the obligations imposed on the employer by the policy statements published in the employee manual, the
court held that this document could give rise to "contractual rights in emthat the policy
ployees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed
'272
statements would create [such] rights in the employee.
The most interesting point in the Toussaint decision is its affirmance
of the right and need for judicial review of discharges for "unsatisfactory
work" in cases where the employer has agreed to discharge for cause only.
The court reasoned that an employer's promise to discharge for good cause
only would be illusory "if the employer were permitted to be the sole judge
and final arbiter of the propriety of the discharge. ' 273 This case appears to
constitute a complete break with the employment-at-will doctrine 274 and it
recognizes the right of an employee to retain his job based on the establishment by an employee of a reasonable expectation that he will retain his job
absent the establishment of cause for dismissal. Thus, the employer's right
267. Id at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
268. Id
269. Id at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885 (emphasis added).
270. Id at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
271. Id
272. Id at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
273. Id at 621, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
274. The Michigan court said that "a provision of an employment contract providing that an
employee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although the contract is
not for a definite term-the term is 'indefinite'...." Id at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885. Contra
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568 P.2d 764,769 (1977) (employee's own
personal understanding that he would be employed as long as he did his job in a satisfactory
manner was insufficient to establish implied employment agreement which allowed employer to
discharge employee only for just cause).
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to discharge is similarly viewed as a qualified right. According to the Toussaint opinion, the decision to terminate must now meet a new legal standard, that of "just cause."
III. THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE: MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN FACE
OF THE RECOGNITION OF AN EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT

To His

JOB

Two consequences follow from the erosion of the employment-at-will
doctrine. First, a growing recognition of the employee's right to his job, a
right which is qualified by a showing of good cause for dismissal. Second,
the gradual recognition of limitations on the previously absolute right of
the employer to dismiss an employee-at-will: requirements of good cause
and possibly procedural due process. These consequences give rise to a
continuing need to resolve conflicts between the exercise of the employer's
termination power and the employee's expectation of continued employment. Because a growing minority of courts are favorably disposed toward
the claims of terminated employees, it is reasonable to expect that these
employees will increasingly contest their termination in wrongful discharge suits filed against their employers. This probability of increased
litigation must be a concern to employers and should cause them to develop planning strategies which will establish a justified basis for dismissal
where they choose to exercise their power to discharge. Also, employers
must be able to counter claims of employees for unjust dismissal by establishing factors which properly limit an employee's asserted right to continued employment. The lack of specificity in the courts' pronouncements
regarding the concept of "public policy,"' 275 however, complicates the employers development of strategies to meet this challenge. Another complication is that juries, in the future, may be permitted to find public policy
exceptions where an employer discharges an employee for the employee's
highly publicized political activities, for the employee's arrest and indictment for criminal activities, and for the consumer-employee's criticism of
the employer's product. 276 Such cases will likely be tried by juries composed of individuals who are themselves similarly situated employees, and
therefore, they will be more sympathetic to the dismissed employee. If the
analysis of rights is to be principled, and not simply a matter of self-interest or sympathy, it is incumbent upon legal commentators and employer
advocates to delineate a principled account of the proper limits on the employee's right and to establish a principled basis for employers to exercise
their right to discharge. Employer liability is not limited to claims for reinstatement based on the right to a job, but may extend as well to damages in
wrongful discharge situations. Thus, if the court finds that an employee
has been wrongfully discharged, the employee may be permitted to recover
both compensatory and punitive damages for a variety of injuries, 277 in275. See generally supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
276. Olsen, supra note 128, at 282-83.
277. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330
(1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind.249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.
Va. 1978).
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cluding mental anguish and pain and suffering. 27 8 Potential liability must
also be considered as employers develop strategies to deal with employees
assertion of their right to continued employment.
The management approaches discussed below will balance the prerogative of the employer in managing his business and retaining the personnel he wants against the rights of the employees to a measure of job
security. By establishing a principled basis for such a balance, it is hoped
that the continuing need for judicial intervention 279 in corporations' relationships with their employees will be minimized. Such a balance requires
currecognition that the employment-at-will rule is no longer viable under
2 80
rent economic conditions, and therefore, should be abandoned.
Traditionally, courts have long recognized that employees owe their
employers a duty to render obedient, respectful service. 28 ' Recognition of
this duty will continue even with acceptance of the employee's claim to a
right is his job. The employees right is not absolute but qualified by the
requirement that he fulfill his work obligations and that he not act in such
a way as to provide the employer with a legal cause basis for his dismissal.
Implied in the employment contract is the employee's promise to obey all
the reasonable rules and directions of the employer.2 82 The courts, therefore, have proved willing to uphold dismissals based on employee's disobedience or insubordination because these actions amount to rescissions of
the employment contract. 28 3 On the other hand, employees need to know
under what circumstances they will be disciplined or ultimately discharged. The employer, therefore, must establish a system whereby workers understand what is expected of them and the manner in which they are
278. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
279. Commentators and case law have recommended judicial intervention in order to redress

the inherent imbalance between the bargaining powers of the employee and employer or to review
'Just cause" terminations. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 621, 292
N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980); Blades, supra note 2, at 1433-34.

280. Because of the need for increased specialization, the employee's mobility in changing jobs
has been severely curtailed.

Blades, supra note 2, at 1405. Over two decades ago, Professor

Corbin gave recognition to this need in his treatise on contracts:
The relations between... employer and employee have been subject to constant evolution during this history of Anglo-American law. It is not too much to say that this is the
most important and far reaching manifestation of the evolution of society, of human
civilization, of the legal, social, political, and economic relations of men and women with
each other. There are no longer the old relations of owner and slave. . . [W]e are in the
midst of a period in which the pot boils hardest and the process of change fastest.
3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS ch. 674, at 205-06 (1960).

281. See Thomas v. Houston, Stanwood & Gamble Co., 146 Ky. 156, 159, 142 S.W. 214, 215
(1912) (employee's obedience needed for orderly expedition of employer's business); Von Heyne
v. Tompkins, 89 Minn. 77, 81, 93 N.W. 901, 903 (1903) (obedience to employer's reasonable orders
is employee's main duty). See generally Blumberg, CorporateResponsiblity and the Employee s
DutyfLoyaltyand Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA.L. REV. 279 (1971); Stevens, The
AM. Bus. Li. 371 (1980).
for I'subordination,
Employee
Discharging
Le 282. yof
Thomas
v. Houston,
Stanwoad
& Gamble Co., 18
146 Ky. 156, 142 S.W. 214 (1912); Macintosh v. Abbot, 231 Mass. 180, 120 N.E. 383 (1918); Lee v. Missouri Pac Ry. Co., 335 S.W.2d 92
(Mo. 1960).
283. See, e.g., Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1974) (refusal to obey an order to discontinue a lawsuit against employer); Mallard v. Boring, 182
Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960) (employee ordered not to serve on jury). But see Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (defendants could not terminate employee because she
agreed to jury duty).
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expected to fulfill their contractual obligations. This objective can be accomplished through a system of performance standards derived from careful job analyses. These performance standards should limit as much as
the opportunities for subjective evaluation by the employer or his
possible
28 4
agent.
There are, generally, two approaches to establishing a basis for identification of reasonable limitations on the exercise of conflicting rights by
employer and employee. The first approach may be characterized as substantive, to the extent that it calls for the specification of duties of employees and for an employer's statement of the grounds for dismissal. A
second approach may be characterized as procedural, as it calls for the
establishment of neutral persons or basis to determine the validity of alleged bases for dismissal. This approach requires the establishment of procedures to ensure that aggrieved employees have some recourse to
challenge an employer's action as arbitrary or capricious. What is required is the establishment of an effective grievance-handling procedure.
A 1977 HarvardBusiness Review survey of corporate executives indicates
recognition by businessmen of the desirability of such procedural safeguards. 285 This survey indicates that a number of industrial employers
thought that there should be a steady broadening of methods assuring
"due process" who feel they have been wronged by management; that
there should be increased opportunity for employees to speak out on controversial issues; that there should be increased recognition and protection
of a right of privacy for employees; and that there should be protection for
dissenting employees, including "whistle blowers. '28 6 To the extent that
these managers are representative of contemporary employers, there is recognition of a need to establish and follow grievance procedures or mechanisms which provide some measure of "due process' to employees who feel
themselves to be the victims of "retaliation from arbitrary and unethical
bosses. ' 287 Specifically, there is recognition of a need to establish an open
door policy by managers to employees who think they have been wronged;
that there is a need to appoint personnel executives who will investigate
and report to top management on employee grievances; that there is a need
to establish management grievance committees including senior executives
who will investigate grievances and report to top management; that there is
a need to establish corporate "ombudsmen" or "ombudswomen"; 288 and
284. This conclusion was derived from cases involving disparate impact charges. For exam-

ple, Sandia Corporation's employee performance evaluation procedures were shown to have been
the main basis for layoff decisions affecting a disproportionate number of older employees. Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (10th Cir. 1981); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 612-20 (10th Cir. 1980). The trial court commented that
the appraisal system "was extremely subjective and had never been validated." 639 F.2d at 614.
That court also stated that there was "sufficient circumstantial evidence to indicate that age bias
and aged based policies appear throughout the performance rating process. .. ." Id See generaly Holley, PerformanceAppraisalsand the Law, 26 LAB. L.J. 423 (1975); Winstanely, Legal and
EthicalIssues in PeforrmanceAppraisals, 58 HARV. Bus. Rav. 186 (1980).
285. Ewing, What Business h7inks 4bout Employee Rights, 55 HARv. Bus. REv.81 (1977).
286. Id at 82.
287. Id at 83.
288. This is a preferred grievance procedure, Winstanely, supra note 284, at 192, because it
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finally, that there is a need to establish hearing procedures that allow employees to be represented by attorneys or other persons, with a neutral
party deciding on matters of evidence and rendering a final decision. 2 89
The establishment of such grievance procedures would also be useful
in dealing with the previously discussed problem of "whistle blowers."
There is a concern that if employers do not provide a means for employees
to speak up and if employers do not exercise self-restraint in dismissing
those who do speak out in the public interest, the government will intervene more vigorously to provide employees with protection in their
jobs. 290 A creative approach to employees' grievances may be found in
IBM's "Speak-Up" program which IBM claims has resulted in management giving "considerable attention to listening to its workers and acting
on their suggestions." 29 1 This program is founded on both a policy of encouraging employees to speak out with a guarantee of job security when
they do speak out and on procedures which are designed to efficiently process complaints and to protect the identity of the complainant. IBM's
stated policy is to regard "whistle blowers" as loyal employees whose constructive criticisms are encouraged in an effort to improve the product or
the corporation, and therefore, these employees
are viewed as making a
292
valuable contribution to the company.
Employers seeking to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, their
right to dismiss employees who fail to perform or conform to reasonable
expectations, must themselves contribute to the definition of the content
and limits on the increasingly recognized right of the employee to his or
her job.293 Employers, therefore, must assure employees that they will not
interfere with basic political freedoms. Employers should encourage an
open environment in which employees freely express their views, including
ones which are deemed controversial. Employers should develop streamlined grievance procedures so that employees can get direct and impartial
hearings on issues on which they are likely to blow the whistle if their
complaints are not heard quickly and fairly. A great deal of whistle blowing occurs because the organization is unresponsive to early warnings from
its employees. A firm commitment to an "open door" policy would make
much whistle blowing unnecessary.
Employers should give formal recognition and openly declare to employees a respect for their individual conscientious activity. It is clear that
in dealing harshly with whistle blowing employees, employers inevitably
become the subject of adverse public reaction and publicity. Respecting
an employee's right to differ with organizational policy on some matters,
even beyond what the law requires, is in the long run in the best interest of
employers.
"can be very effective in raising the level of objectivity, ensuring a measure ofjustice, and advancing perceptions of management's fairness."
289. Ewing, supra note 285, at 83.
290. Cook, supra note 171, at 52.
291. Id at 53.
292. Id
293. Id at 55-56; Ewing, supra note 285, at 91; Walters, Your Employees Right to Blow the
Whistle, 55 HARv. Bus. REv. 34, 161-62 (1975).
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While employers are not required by law to establish and promulgate
general personnel policies, where an employer does establish such procedures, they should be made known to their employees. Notice to the employees enhances the employment relationship and the respective rights of
employer and employee are set out in a way which gives them presumptive
legitimacy. Not only is there a formal recognition of respective rights and
duties, but by such actions the employer increases the likelihood that it will
secure an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force. For their part employees gain a measure of peace of mind which is the object of and is
associated with job security, that is, the expectation that they will be
treated fairly. It is in the employer's interest to create an environment in
which his employees know that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, there are established standards and procedures which govern the employer's employment decisionmaking and that these standards purport to
be fair and are to be applied consistently and uniformly to each employee. 294 Finally, managers in an environment where meaningful "due
process" is guaranteed, will most likely need instruction in the employer's
policies and procedures in addition to training in certain skills such as rating employees and feedback communication. While such an approach will
not eliminate all disputes, it is clear that the potential for legal complaints
will be diminished.
IV.

UNJUST DISMISSAL LAW IN OTHER COUNTRIES

This Article has discussed judicial and legislative trends in the United
States toward providing recognition and protection of rights of an employee in his job. It remains true, however, that the United States has
trailed behind other highly industrialized countries in providing statutory
or judicial protection against unjust employment dismissals. 295 This section will briefly examine how various European countries have dealt with
the issue of wrongful dismissal through legislative enactments in order to
provide a basis for consideration of ways in which the right to a job can be
given more substantive definition and more effective procedural implementation in the United States.
A. InternationalLabor OrganizationRecommendation
International organizations have taken the lead in recognizing a
worker's right in his job. In 1963, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) adopted Recommendation 119, "Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer," 296 which stated: "Termina294. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich, 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980);

Holley, supra note 284, at 429.
295. Steiber, ProtectionAgainst
UnfairDismissal A Comparative View, 3 COMP. LA. L. 229
at 508.
(1979); Summers, supra note 68,
296. See II ACTS OF FiFTH INTERNAIoNAL CONGRESS OF LABOUR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURrrY 1963, REGULATION OF DISPUTES CONCERNING THE EMPLOYER'S EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINARY
PowERs 571 (1963); I.L.O., DISMIssAL PROCEDURES IN NINE COUNTRIES, 533-49 (1963) [Hereinafter cited as I.L.O. REPORT]. See also Symposium, ComparativeLabor Law andLaw ofthe Employment Relation, 18 RuTo. L. REv. 233, 446 (1964), which contains extracts of an English
translation of the I.L.O. REPORT.
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tion of employment should not take place unless there is a valid reason for
such termination connected with capacity or conduct of the worker or
based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment,
or service." 297 Recommendation 119 further provided that a worker who
felt that he had been unjustly dismissed from employment should be entitled to appeal the termination to "a body established under a collective
agreement or to a neutral body such as a court, an arbitrator, an arbitration committee, or a similar body. ' 298 According to these procedures, if a
discharge is deemed to be unjustified, the appeal body is entitled to order
that the employee be reinstated or be paid "adequate compensation" or be
provided with other appropriate relief.299 Under Recommendation 119,
except for cases of serious misconduct, a discharged employee should be
provided proper and timely notice or compensation where such notice is
not given. 3°° It is further provided that termination for serious misconduct
should be limited to situations where the employer cannot in good faith be
expected to take any other course, 30 1 and an employee accused of serious
misconduct should be given an opportunity to state his case promptly, with
the assistance of a representative where appropriate. 30 2 It should be noted,
however, that Recommendation 119 does not define the term "serious misconduct"; it thus remains open to interpretation by employers and tribunals in each country. Recommendation 119 reflects a recognition on the
part of the international community of an employee's reasonable interest
and expectation in a qualified right to his job. At the same time it establishes a principled account of that right, and gives implicit recognition to a
right of an employer to dismiss where there is serious failure to meet job
requirements. There is a certain hortatory quality to Recommendation
119, and it is therefore useful to consider how various European nations
have given legislative or regulatory effect to this claimed right to a job,
B.

European Community Proposal

Following ILO Recommendation 119, the European Commission in
1976, examined various employment practices, specifically with regard to
dismissal, which were in effect in various member countries of the European Economic Community. 30 3 Subsequently, the- Commission advanced
proposals to serve as a basis for a European Commission directive on individual discharges from employment. The Commission issued a report
containing these proposals in the form of guidelines aimed at providing a
uniform standard for employer exercise of the right to discharge, and implicitly providing an effective formulation of the right of an employee to
297. I.L.O. REPORT § 2(a), in 18 RUTO. L. REv. 233, 449 (1964).
298. Id § 4, in 18 RUTO. L. REv. at 450.
299. Id § 6, in 18 RUTG. L. REv. at 450.

300. Id § 7(a), in 18 Rutm. L. REv. at 450.
301. Id § l1(b), in 18 RUTO. L. REv. at 451. See generally T. KENNEDY, EUROPEAN LABOR
RELATIONS 386 (1980).

302. I.L.O. REPORT § 11(e), in 18 RUTo. L. REv. at 452.
303. Proposed Report, Commission to the Council of European Economic Community, Protection of Workers in the Event of Individual Dismissals, in the Member States of the European
Communities, in EUR. INDUS. REL. REV. No. 30 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EEC REPORT].
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his job.3°4
The guidelines begin by providing that discharge is justified only
when based on "serious grounds. '30 5 "Serious grounds" is defined in terms
of "urgent requirements of the firm," that is, an employer is-justified in
discharging an employee only when it is impossible or unreasonable for
economic or technical reasons or for reasons connected with the person or
behavior of the worker, for the employer to continue the employment relationship. 306 Such serious grounds reflect the limitations or qualifications
on the employees' right to a job, which in turn establishes the legitimate
basis for the employer's exercise of its right to discharge. The guidelines
provide that personal grounds for dismissal shall be deemed to exist when
an employee has, over a long period of time, shown himself to be incapable of carrying out his duties. 30 7 Similarly, behavioral grounds for dismissal are said to presuppose a serious breach of a worker's obligations under
the individual employment contract. 308 Even when such grounds exist, the
guidelines provide that dismissal should be a last resort and even when
dismissal is unavoidable, employers should take account of an employee's
age, length of service, and future job prospects in the terms of the severance. 30 9 According to the Commission's report, a worker should be entitled to written notice of dismissal, a written statement of the grounds for
310
dismissal upon request, and be advised of his legal rights and remedies.
Moreover, consultation with worker representatives should precede dismissal and minimum notice of thirty days should be given except in cases
of "summary dismissal."'31 ' The guidelines provide that "summary dismissal" should be resorted to only if the employee is guilty of such a severe
breach of his obligations under the employment contract that the employer
cannot reasonably be expected to observe a notice period. Finally, legality
at the request of the employee, be examined by
of every termination must,
3 12
an independent body.
The European Commission's recommendations are clearly stated to
be minimum standards with the individual member countries being free to
adopt more favorable measures to protect employees. 31 3 While the above
standards are only proposed guidelines and have not been adopted by the
European Community,31 4 they do give specific substantive and procedural
content to the concept of a principled right to a job and they specify the
corresponding limitations on the employer's right to discharge.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

EEC REPORT, supra note 303, at 25.
Id at 10.
Id at 15.
Id at 17.
Id at 23.
Id at 24.
Id at 25.

311. Id
312. Id at 29.

313. Steiber, supra note 295, at 231.
314. These recommendations were based on conclusions drawn from a survey of dismissal law
in EEC member countries and this legislation is now outdated. See Sherman, Reinstatement as a
Remedy for Unfair Dismissalin Common Market Countries, 29 AM. I CoMP. L. 467, 468 n.8
(1981).
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C. Statutory Protection in Individual Countries
While European Commission guidelines are only recommendations, a
number of European nations have in fact given explicit recognition to an
employee's right to his job, and have given specific substantive and procedural content to this conception. It will be useful to consider briefly the
scope and extent of the protection against unjust dismissal afforded to employees by a select group of European states. It should be observed that
employment relations, including dismissals, are statutorily regulated in all
Common Market countries and in Sweden and Norway.
1. Austria
Austria's employment relations are governed by a Labor Code which
went into effect in 1976. 3 15 The central premise underlying the Labor
Code is "codetermination," that is, employee participation in all Austrian
industry.3 16 This policy of "codetermination" involves the principle of
shared decisionmaking by employees and employers. This shared decisionmaking is carried out in the conventional firm by two boards: a Management Board with the function of managing day-to-day operations and a
Supervisory Board similar to an American board of directors. Employee
representatives are elected to sit on the Supervisory Board, and in Austria
3 17
one third of the members of this Board are employee representatives.
The Austrian mechanism for providing employees participation in the
business of the corporation in the work council system. 3 18 Works councils
are composed of employee representatives who have certain rights and responsibilities which are clearly spelled out in the Labor Code.3 19 The
councils have the right to inspect wage and salary lists as part of their
function to monitor collective agreements. 320 The employer is required to
inform the works council on all matters of employee policy and decisionmaking. The works council must come to agreement with the employer on
all disciplinary actions before they are initiated as well as on all other types
of personnel policy decisions which might affect the status of the company's employees. 32 1 As a result of this structure, the works council enjoys
considerable authority regarding dismissals of employees. 322 Because of
315. Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz [ARBVG] (1976) (Austria), in Traub, Codetermination and the
New Austrian Labor Code: A Multi-ChannelSystem of Employee Participation,4 INTL LAW. 613

(1980).

316. The German term is mitbestimmung which does not have a precise English translation,

but carries the connotation of active participation in the process of decisionmaking. See generally
THE CODETERMINATION MOVEMENT IN THE WEST., LABOR PARTICIPATION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS FIRMS (S. Pejovich ed. 1978).

317. ARBVG § 4, in Traub, supra note 315, at 614.
318. Id § 40(1), in Traub, supra note 315, at 621. See generally W. KOLVENBACH, EMPLOYEE

(1979).
ARBVG § 40(1), in Traub, supra note 315, at 621.
Id
Id § 99, in Traub, supra note 315, at 623.
Id § 102, in Traub, supra note 315, at 623. See AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE,
NEW LABOUR CODE 14, 15 (1974). The commentary on the statute states: "The employer has to
COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

319.
320.
321.
322.

give the council warning of his intention and the workers' representatives then have a certain
period within which they can lodge a protest with the Conciliation Board, an independent arbitration body designed to settle labor disputes." Id
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the relationship between the works council and dismissal decisions, the
employer usually contacts the council at an early stage to discuss all personnel issues thoroughly; special attention is paid to ways to minimize social hardship arising from measures which are not to be avoided.
Observers have noted that the "strict legal provisions concerning dismissal,
combined with the sense of responsibility felt by Austrian employers for
the security of their workers'
jobs have meant that major cuts in personnel
323
occur only occasionally."
2. France
During the nineteenth century, both French and United States employment law stressed the concept of mutuality as the fundamental doctrine governing the employer-employee relationship with the result that
either party had the right to terminate the relationship at will. 324 French
courts specifically adopted the employment-at-will rule whereby either
party could terminate the relationship at any time for any or no reason. 325
The status of the law started to change towards the end of the nineteenth
century, culminating in 1928 with the codification of the principle of abus
de droit (abuse of right).3 26 According to this principle, the employer
would be liable for abusive termination of an employment contract if "he
acted with malicious intent, culpable negligence, or capriciousness. '327
Since 1973, when the labor code was amended, the most important
regulatory mechanism protecting French employees is the restriction of an
employer's right to dismiss. Employers must fulfill both procedural and
substantive requirements imposed by specific legislative enactments. The
most significant of these is the requirement that the employer possess genuine and serious cause for the dismissal based on something the employee
did or failed to do. 328 Employees who believe that they have been wrongfully discharged are required to bring their actions before a labor court,
which is a bipartite judicial body composed of equal numbers of employees and employers. 329 These special courts exercise almost absolute jurisdiction over the trial of employer-employee disputes. Practice reveals that
323. AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, supra note 322.
324. See EUROPEAN COAL & STEEL COMMUNITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOi DANS LE
DROIT DE PAYS MEMBRES DE LA C.E.C.A., 218-24 (1958); see also F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF
JOBS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 3 (1964).
325. EUROPEAN COAL & STEEL COMMUNITY, supra note 324, at 218-24; see also T. KENNEDY,
supra note 301, at 386; Summers, supra note 68, at 509.
326. Summers, supra note 68, at 510.

327. Id
328. CODE DE TRAVAILLE [C. TRAV.] arts. L 122-14-2 & L 122-14-3 (1978). See also Note,
Termination of French Labor Contracts, 14 INVL LAW. 267, 269 (1980). The French Labor Code

recognizes four categories of employee misconduct that might lead to dismissal: (1) Faute lourde
(flagrant misconduct) includes offenses such as theft, breach of professional ethics and other seri-

ous offenses. This type of behavior justifies immediate dismissal with loss of all rights to severence
or vacation pay; (2) Fautegrave (gross misconduct) includes behavior less serious than the flagrant
misconduct, but still leads to immediate dismissal with loss of severance pay, but not of vacation
pay; (3) Cause relle et sbrieuse (genuine and serious cause) the employer has to maintain the
burden to prove that the dismissal was justified; (4) FautekgAre (minor misconduct) such as tardi-

ness, absenteeism. T. KENNEDY, supra note 301, at 54.
329. C. TRAy. art. L. 511-1 (1978). See also Aaron, TheAdministration of Justice in Labor Law
Arbitrationand the Role of the Courts: InternationalSurvey, 3 COMP. LAB. L. 1, 7 (1979).
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disposed towards employees and vigorthese courts are sympathetically
330
ously implement these laws.
3.

Germany

Until 1920, German labor law was similar to French and American
in
an employment contract for an indefinite period could be terlaw
inatedthat
by either party with or without cause. 33 ' Since 1920, employment
has been statutorily regulated, and today German employees enjoy comprehensive protection from wrongful dismissals. 3 32 The governing statute
defines unfair discharge as dismissals that are "socially unwarranted," that
is, "not based on reasons connected with the person or conduct of the employee. '3 33 Grounds justifying summary dismissal without notice include:
stealing business secrets, theft of property, fraud, fighting, and insubordination. 334 One commentator has characterized the overall rationale for
termination of German employees as requiring a showing that the conduct
which serves as the basis for discharge is related to the job and is of such a
is the only means to insure the employer's continued
nature that dismissal
33 5
effective operation.
Employers must confer with works councils prior to giving notice of
dismissal. The council can object and if it does, the employee must be
retained until the Labor Court renders a decision. 336 The courts are tripartite involving a presiding professional judge, representatives of the emregarding
ployer and of the employee. 337 The courts render their decisions338
dismissals with great expediency, usually in less than a month.
4.

UnitedKingdom

The development of the English employment-at-will rule preceded
that of American labor law,339 but was abrogated in 1971, when the Industrial Relations Act was enacted. 340 This Act recognized that every em330. Note, supra note 328, at 267.
331. I.L.O. REPORT, supra note 296, at 58-59; see also Summers, supra note 68, at 511.
332. Protection Against Unwarranted Dismissals Act of 1951, § 2, 1951 Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil 1 [BGB1] 1499 (W. Ger.). For English translation, see 1951 I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1951
Ger. FR4) (as amended by the Protection Against Dismissal Act of 1969).
333. Protection Against Dismissal Act of 1969, § 1(2), 1969 BGBl1 119 (W. Ger.); Summers,

supra note 68, at 511. See generally T. KENNEDY, supra note 301, at 182.
334. Protection Against Dismissal Act of 1969, § 2(2), 1969 BGB1 I 22 (W. Ger.); Steiber,
supra note 295, at 232.
335. Summers, supra note 68, at 511.
336. Works Council Act of 1972, 1972 BGB1 13 (1972) (for English translation, see 1972
I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1972 Ger. FR1)); Summers, supra note 68, at 512. See generally
Aaron, supra note 329, at 14.
337. Works Council Act of 1972, 1972 BGBI1 13 (1972).
338. Benjamin Aaron, who has conducted a comprehensive international survey of labor
courts commented favorably on the expediency of German labor courts: "In the Federal Republic
of Germany the 'principle of expeditiousness' is effectuated in the labor court system in a variety
of ways: there are no court vacations. . . [and] the appellate labor courts may not remand cases
to lower courts because of procedural errors ...." Aaron, supra note 329, at 25.
339. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
340. Industrial Relations Act 1971, §§ 22 & 24, 41 HAL. STAT. §§ 2062, 2088, 2090 & 2091
(1971). See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 59th SESs. REP. III (PART 4B) (Act repealed
in 1974).
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ployee who has been employed for at least six months has the right not to
be unfairly dismissed by his employer. 34 1 Since 1971 there have been several statutes passed in Britain dealing with dismissal.3 42 The burden of
proof is on the employer to satisfy a tripartite industrial tribunal that he
acted "reasonably. '3 43 The tripartite composition of the tribunal is
designed to bring to bear in each case the industrial experience of the employer and the shared job experience of employees as well as the legal
background of the chairman. The emphasis in unfair dismissal cases is on
accessibility, speed, and informality. Complaints alleging unfair dismissal
are first sent to the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, where a
their disputes without
conciliation officer tries to help the parties resolve
344
the need for a hearing by an industrial tribunal.
The unfair dismissal law has been subject to considerable criticism,
particularly from employers, for several reasons. It is charged that the law
has an inhibitory effect by restricting hiring; the employer has been given
the burden of proving the dismissal was fair; and that the law is especially
burdensome to small employers who do not have formal personnel procedures and therefore, have difficulty proving to tribunals that they acted
reasonably in dismissing an employee. 345 However, a 1978 study of employers in manufacturing industries, made by the Policy Studies Institute
34 6
of Great Britain, found most of the above criticisms to be unjustified.
The study indicated that the major effect of the unfair dismissal law has
been to encourage the reform or formalization of procedures in disciplinary action and dismissals.3 47 Employers are said to now exercise greater
care in selecting new employees and in appraising employee performance. 348 There is also evidence that unfair dismissal measures have reduced rates of dismissal, particularly3 49in some firms where levels were
relatively high prior to the legislation.
341. Dismissal is deemed unfair unless it is based on the employee's abilities, qualifications, or
conduct. Industrial Relations Act 1971, §§ 22, 24, 41 HAL. STAT. 2062, 2088, 2090-91 (3d ed.
1972).
342. In 1975, the Employment Protection Act was passed, 45 HAL. STAT. 2371 (3d ed. 1976).
This statute enlarged the remedies available to employees who have been unfairly dismissed. Employment Protection Act 1975, §§ 71-80, 45 HAL.STAT. 2398-2411 (3d ed. 1976). The provisions
of the 1975 Act were later incorporated into the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978,
§ 57(c), 48 HAL. STAT. 506 (3d ed. 1979). In 1980, the Employment Act was enacted and it re-

stricted some of the provisions of the 1978 Act. Employment Act 1980, §§ 6-9, 50(1) HAL. STAT.
388-92 (3d ed. 1981).

343. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, § 57(3), 48 HAL. STAT. 506 (3d ed.
1979).

344. Id § 67, 48 HAL. STAT. 518.
345. Steiber, supra note 295, at 235. Because of some of the criticisms outlined in the text, the

provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978 have been restricted in the
provisions of the Employment Act of 1980. The 1980 Act does not apply to employers who have
20 or less employees. Employment Act 1980, § 6, 50(1) HAL. STAT. 388 (3d ed. 1981). Also, an

employee cannot file a complaint for unfair dismissal if(l) he started his employment on or after
October 1, 1980; (2) he was continuously employed for less than two years; and (3) at no time
during that period did the number of employees exceed 20. Id. §§ 6-9; 50(1) HAL. STAT. 388-92.
346. Daniel & Stilgoe, The Impact ofEmployment Protection Laws, 44 POLICY STUD. INST.
No. 577 (June 1978).

347. Id at 6.
348. Id at 9.
349. I1d at 8.
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5.

Comparisonand Evaluation of EuropeanLegislation

The experience of the various European nations which have developed legislation to provide protection for an employees right to his job
provides a valuable source of reference for possible legal development in
the United States. More particularly, the form of this legal reform, namely
legislative protection, suggests the propriety of adoption in the United
States of legislative protection for the employee in his or her job.
Until these protection statutes were adopted by the various European
nations, employment relations in those countries were governed by the employment-at-will rule based on the concept of mutuality. These protection
statutes replace this doctrine with strict legal rules governing dismissal.
For the most part these statutes limit dismissal to cases where serious cause
is established; in all other cases dismissal is unfair. In Germany unfair
dismissal is defined as "socially unwarranted"; in France it is dismissal
which is not for "real or serious reasons"; in Austria the standard is "not
for objectively valid grounds," and in England an element of equity is inserted into the definition of employee cause which is established as "unreasonably determined in accordance with equity and substantial merits of
the case." All of these statutes suggest the need to limit dismissal to cases
where valid grounds can be shown which involve a showing that the employee impaired the proper functioning of the employing firm, or at least
some serious misconduct on the part of the employee.
Each of these statutes provide for an independent tribunal or arbitration panel to hear cases of contested dismissal. In the various European
countries, works councils or labor courts decide either initially or on review whether dismissals are or are not justified with reference to the relevant statutory provisions. These tribunals are generally staffed by a legal
expert, an employer representative, and an employee representative. The
effort seems to be one directed at obtaining a rule based decision making
process while drawing on the expertise of representatives of the employer
and employee in order to accommodate special industrial and economic
needs.
Finally, the European legislation provides for some formality in procedures with reference to notice, pleading and burden of proof. In all of
the European statutes, advance notice is required in the ordinary case. In
cases of summary dismissal, however, advance notice is not always required. In France, summary dismissal may be only for "flagrant" or
"gross misconduct." In Germany, dismissal without notice is permitted
only when it is not reasonable to expect an employer to continue the employment relationship. Fairness suggests the necessity of such advance notice in most cases since such notice permits employees to invoke the
judicial or arbitration procedures available, and prevents an employee
from being placed in the position of unemployment with consequent lack
of resources which would impair the employee's ability to challenge the
dismissal.
The procedures for initiating challenges to dismissal and the standard
for establishing such dismissal are left open. Except in France, where
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there is not a clear onus of proof established by statute, the burden of
proof that a dismissal is "fair" rests on the employer. This seems proper
given the fact that the employer initiates the dismissal, and is in control of
the facts which gave rise to the decision to dismiss the employee.
The European statutes are not explicitly limited to any category or
classification of employee. This follows to a large extent from the fact that
they do not have a body of separate labor legislation governing unionized
workers and civil servants as is the case in the United States. Finally, the
European statutes for the most part do not establish a special court nor do
they set out specific procedures for hearing challenges to dismissals. This
follows from the fact that these countries already have special workers
councils and special labor courts which are lacking in the United States.
In the absence of such special councils or tribunals to provide for the vindication of a challenge to an unjust dismissal, jurisdiction must either be
placed in existing courts or in special tribunals which would need to be
established. This latter approach was adopted in the United Kingdom
where a special Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service has been
established to hear complaints of unfair dismissal.
From the European experience, one can observe the need to establish
a standard for unjust dismissal, the necessity of providing procedures to
govern dismissals, and finally the propriety of establishing independent
tribunals or boards to hear complaints of unfair dismissal.
V.

MODEL STATUTE PROPOSAL

The previous section illustrates the type of statutory protection against
wrongful dismissal which employees generally enjoy in Western Europe.
This final section will provide a proposal for a statutory scheme designed
to protect the majority of American employees from wrongful dismissal.
This suggested statute is aimed at giving procedural and substantive content to the concept of a qualified right of an employee to his or her job, and
at the same time delineating the conditions under which an employer may
properly exercise its right to discharge an employee.
A number of commentators have suggested that such legislation either
cannot or should not be developed to provide a delineation of the respective rights of employer and employee and that such protection can be
achieved only through judicial activism. 350 Their rationale for this contention is that employees in need of statutory coverage are not organized, and
therefore, do not constitute a sufficient lobby for the passage of such legislation. Moreover, it is suggested that judicial action would provide more
flexibility to meet the varying needs of employers as well as accommodating changing social and economic conditions. 351 It has been observed that
courts have been called upon in many occasions in the past to "determine
what constitutes good public policy. . . in response to changing social and
350. See Blackburn, supra note 126, at 481; Blades, supra note 2, at 1434; Peck, Some Kindof
HearingforPersonsDischargedfromPrivateEmployment, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 313, 317 (1979);
Peck, supra note 126, at 3.
351. Peck, supra note 350, at 325.
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economic conditions."3 52
It is true that a number of courts seem to be prepared to meet this call
for judicial activism 353 and that they have analyzed the problem of unjust
dismissal from the perspective of "the new climate prevailing generally in
the relationship of employer and employee."3 54 These courts have attempted to balance the "legitimate business interest" of the employer in
"deciding whom it will employ" 355 while maintaining "a large amount of
control
over its work force" 356 with the employees' "interest in job security. '3 7 Some courts have gone so far as to say that there is an overall
societal interest in achieving this balance. 358 A majority of courts, however, have been reluctant to recognize a wrongful discharge cause of action
359
and thus have continued to uphold the employment-at-will doctrine.
These courts have taken the position that such radical 360
departure from
common law principles requires action by the legislature.
Legislation, therefore, may be the most effective solution in dealing
with what is increasingly recognized as an outmoded rule governing employment relations. Several writers have proposed that the present statutory coverage afforded to a minority of employees either by labor law or
the civil service law extend to all employees. 36 1 Another commentator has
suggested that the arbitration model which is almost universally accepted
by employers and unions in collective bargaining be used as the basis for
this legislation.3 62 The legislative scheme that is proposed here parallels
352. Blackburn, supra note 128, at 481.
353. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 n.3 (1980). The court cites to a
total of 13 jurisdictions which have recognized the tort of "abusive discharge" when the termination is violative of some public policy, and six other states which seem to be prepared to do so
under appropriate circumstances. Id.
354. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
355. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977).
356. Id
357. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 42, 432 A.2d 464, 470 (1981).
358. Id; Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 67, 417 A.2d 505, 511 (1980).
359. See De Marco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Feola v. Valmont, Inc, 208 Neb. 527, 304 N.W.2d 377 (1981); Edwards v. Citibank N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 425
N.Y.S.2d 327 (1980). See also supra notes 151, 161 & 178 and accompanying text.
360. See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., - Ind. App. -, 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1066 (1980); Martin v.
Platt, - Ind. App. -, 386 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (1979); Reiter v. Yellowstone County, - Mont.-,
-, 627 P.2d 845, 849 (1981).
361. Peck, supra note 350, at 323; Steiber, supra note 295, at 239-40; Summers, supra note 68,
at 519-31; Summers, Protecting.11EmployeesAgainst Unjust Dismissal,58 HARv. Bus. REV. 132,
137 (1980); Note, 4 Remedyfor the Discharge of ProfessionalEmployees who Refuse to Perform
Unethicalor IllegalActs: .4Proposalin Aid of ProfessionalEthics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 829-40
(1975).
362. Professor Summers recommends that "legal protection against unjust dismissal can best
be built upon standards and procedures of our existing arbitration system .... [O]ur arbitration
system has developed a substantial cadre of individuals who are experienced in hearing discipline
cases and applying the 'just cause' standard." Summers, supra note 68, at 521. See also Summers,
supra note 361, at 137-38.
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the
Supreme Court of Michigan remarked that "[t]he employer can avoid the perils ofjury assessment
by providing for an alternative method of dispute resolution. A written agreement for a definite
or indefinite term to discharge only for cause could ... provide for binding arbitrationon the
issues of causes and damages." Id at 624, 292 N.W.2d at 897 (emphasis added). Professor Summers further comments that the solution to the unjust dismissal problem would consist of statutorily articulating "the right of employees not to be disciplined except for 'just cause'. . . . The
statute need not ... attempt to define 'just cause,' for the existing body of precedent has given it a
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964363 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 364 in its procedural recommendations. According to this
approach, the employee must carry the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of "unjust dismissal" in violation of his contract of employment. 365 Further, after the establishment of such a prima facie showing, the burden of going forward then shifts to the employees to provide
evidence that the termination was justified by "business necessity" 36 6 or
for violation of the terms of employment. 367 Finally, an employee may
attack the employer's explanation on the grounds that it is merely a pretext
by showing that the actual reason for discharge is one prohibited by con-

tract or public policy. 368 Under this approach, the employee bears the ulti-

mate burden of proving that he was terminated wrongfully. 3 69 The
measure of the burden should be determined by the arbitration board on
the basis of the conclusions it draws in the specific case as to the nature of
the contract between the parties.
The statute being proposed here would cover all employees not presently covered by collective bargaining or by Title VII provisions, who have
completed a one year probationary period. The "just cause" standard described above would not be defined, because it should be left up to the
arbitrators to interpret it according to the specific job situations. Such an
analysis would be conducted by striking a balance between both the employer's and employee's interests and rights. The statute would exclude
from coverage top corporate executives such as vice presidents and presi-

workably defined content while preserving its flexibility.
Summers, supra note 68, at 521;
see generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, ch. IS (3d ed. 1973).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
364. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
365. The Title VII case law for the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination is
based on the paradigm developed by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), where the court said "It]he complainant in a Title VII trial must carry
the initial burden ... of establishing a prima fade case of... discrimination." Id at 802.

366. Under traditional Title VII analysis, the concept of "business necessity" constitutes a

defense to a charge of disparate impact. This judicially created defense was articulated in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). "The Act [Title VII] proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touch
stone is business necessity." Id at 431. See generally Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business
Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979); Note, Fair
Employment Practices: The Concept ofBusiness Necessity, 3 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REv. 76 (1972).
367. See supra note 366.
368. A California court proposed this scheme for the trial court to apply in analyzing a wrongful termination case:
We have held that appelant has demonstrated a prima fade case of wrongful termination
in violation of his contract of employment. The burden of coming forward with evidence as to the reason for appelant's termination now shifts to the employer. Appelant
may attack the employer's offered explanation, either on the ground that it is pretextual
(and that the real reason is one prohibited by contract or public policy), or on the ground
that it is insufficient to meet the employer's obligations under contract or applicable legal
principles. [Appellant] bears, however, the ultimate burden of proving that he was terminated wrongfully.
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981).
369. In another California decision, the court stated that "[w]e recognize - . that plaintiff has
the burden of proving that he was terminated unjustly and that the employer.., will have its
opportunity to demonstrate that it did in fact exercised good faith and fair dealing with respect to
plaintiff." Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal.App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980);
see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981).
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dents, because of the high degree of discretion that companies should be
afforded in choosing and retaining employees in these positions. Because
this type of statute might impose a hardship on very small employers (less
than twenty-five employees), they would be exempted from the reach of
this legislation. This statute is addressed solely to incidents of termination,
or constructive dismissal. It does not deal with other forms of disciplinary
actions, because it is difficult to define the wide ranging basis and the varying nature of such disciplinary action by statute, and thus, a case-by-case
judicial analysis should be more productive.
Reinstatement or compensatory damages is the remedy provided by
the statute in case of a finding of wrongful dismissal. In cases of "malicious" dismissals, which would be designated to cover employees terminated for refusing to commit illegal acts at the request of the employer, the
discharged employee would be awarded punitive damages, in addition to
compensatory damages.
Commentators have observed that such a statutory proposal would
very likely meet with serious opposition from companies and employers.
Some of these potential objections have been identified as including the
difficulty in defining and proving the just cause criteria; that the employers' personnel retention policies might be negatively affected by restrictions
on dismissal of unproductive employees, or employees with whom they
have personality conflicts; that in general such a scheme would hamper
employers' ability to maintain employee discipline and to manage and
control the enterprise; and that arbitrators with no industrial experience
370
would be placed in a position to second-guess management decisions.
Nevertheless, a most compelling response to these objections is that recommendations contained in this statute are already incorporated in all collective bargaining agreements without the feared consequences for either the
business community or the economy. Moreover, the force of these objections is diminished when one recognizes the strength of the employee's
interest in having a right to continue in his job where just cause for dismissal does not exist, and by the fact that this statutory scheme, by providing a
basis for cause dismissal, is a powerful tool for management to control the
work force.
CONCLUSION

The death knell is sounding for the employment-at-will doctrine; the
unfettered right of an employer to discharge an employee is being replaced
by recognition of a scheme of qualified rights and duties of employer and
employee. The days of total discretion over employee discharge are over.
A minority of jurisdictions have recognized the need for fair treatment of
employees and have consequently taken steps to provide principled protection for workers from unjustified and arbitrary employer actions. In dealing with this problem, either through judicial activism or through statutory
reform, a balancing analysis between two competing interests must take
370. Summers, supra note 361, at 138.
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place. On the one hand, the employer must be free to conduct and manage
his business as he sees fit; on the other hand, the employee must be assured
of freedom from unjust dismissal, with a consequent measure ofjob security. The result is a recognition of a qualified right of an employee to his or
her job and a qualified right of an employer to discharge. The employee's
right is qualified by his or her obligation to perform. The employer's right
to discharge is qualified by a requirement to show cause and the provision
of procedural due process.
Employers can avoid litigation or legislative intervention by establishing performance standards and by improving their internal complaint procedures. Many employers must change some of their procedures to meet
this challenge. They must give closer scrutiny to their hiring and training
practices in order to ensure that they have the best personnel possible. Additionally, they will have to establish a system of performance standards
which is fair and equitable of all employees. Employer managers must be
trained in the techniques required to implement this system of substantive
standards and procedural requirements as well as to be able to evaluate
and rate the employees according to the relative standards which are established. An internal disciplinary procedure mechanism should be created
that will prevent employees from being deprived of the "property a man
has in his labor, his trade or profession," without "due process."'37' Courts
can and are giving recognition to the claim of employees to rights in their
job by developing exceptions to and limitations on the employment-at-will
doctrine. Ultimately, however, the most effective way in which the rights
of employer and employee can be recognized and reconciled is through the
establishment of a statutory scheme which limits dismissal to "just cause"
and which provides procedures for the fair determination of the existence
or lack of just cause.

371. The concept of a property interest is not new in the context of job rights. In Jones v.
Leslie, 61 Wash. 107, 112 P. 81 (1910), while holding that the defendant interfered with the plain-

tifs property right by attempting to prevent him from leaving his employment for a better job, the
court stated:

It would be well to remember.

. .

that it is fundamental that man has a right to be

protected in his property. This was the doctrine of the common laws, is, and always has
been, the law in every civilized nation. It is, of necessity, one of the fundamental princi-

ples of government .... For the protection of life, liberty, and property, men have

yielded up their natural rights and established governments. Is then, the right of em-

ployment in a laboring man property? That it is, we think cannot be questioned. The
property of the capitalist is his gold and silver. . . for in these he deals and makes his
living . . . . And every man's trade or profession is his property, because through its
agency, he maintains himselfandfamiiy .... Can it be said, with any degree ofsense of
justice, that theproperty which a man has in his labor, which is thefoundatlonof allproperty and which is the only capitalofso large a majority of citizens of our country, is not
property or,at least,not that characterofproperty which can demand the boon ofproteclionfrom the government? We think not.
id at 110, 112 P. 81, at 82 (emphasis added).
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Appendix
Model Statute: Employees Protection Act

PREAMBLE

Employees increasingly find themselves subject to arbitrary and capricious dismissal from employment. The loss of employment resulting in
economic dislocation and long-term unemployment leads to deterioration
of job skills, demoralization of the affected employee, and eventually to a
decrease in overall industrial productivity. Therefore, the lack of a legally
recognized property right in employment and job security has direct and
indirect economic consequences which when present in industries affecting
commerce, burden commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
The purpose of this Act is to protect employees from arbitrary and
capricious dismissal from employment by prohibiting discharge without
good cause, therefore insuring that employees have a legally enforceable
property right in employment, with a subsequent measure of job security.
This Act will aid both employers and employees to devise impartial dismissal guidelines based on recognized standards of performance, and equitable procedures to insure that employees are given a fair hearing when
faced with dismissal.
This Act is designed to cover employees not currently protected by
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or of the National
Labor Relations Act.
SECTION

1:

DEFINITIONS

As used in this Act:
(A) The term "person" means an individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or any other legal entity.
(B) The term "employer" means a person engaged in industry (affecting
commerce) who has twenty-five or more employees on the date this Act
becomes effective. Employer includes an agent of an employer, but the
term does not include the state or a political subdivision of the state, the
United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the government of the
United States.
(C) The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer. Employee does not include any person employed by the state or a
political subdivision of the state (United States government) and employees subject to the civil service laws of the state's governmental agencies or
political subdivisions.
(D) The term "top corporate executive" means employees who are either
officers of the employer or are employed in management jobs for setting
the course of the employer.
(E) The term "probationary period" means the first year of employment
of an employee.
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(F) The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity, business, or industry in commerce and includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Labor-Management Disclosure
Act of 1959.
(G) The term "arbitration board" means the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration.
SECTION

2:

PROHIBITION OF UNJUST DISMISSAL

(A) Employer Practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee who
has completed the statutory probationary period, without good cause.
(B) Opposition to Unlawful Practices; Participation in Investigations,
Proceedings, or Litigation
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees because such an individual has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding
or litigation under this legislation.
(C) Lawful Practices
It shall not be unlawful for an employer(1) To take any action otherwise prohibited under Subsection
(A) of this section where the affected employee is a top corporation
executive
(2) To discharge an individual for good cause.
SECTION

3:

ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

(A) A person who alleges a violation of this act may refer the matter to
the arbitration board within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged
violation. Whenever the board is notified of the alleged violation, a panel
of the said board, as directed by its chairman, shall proceed with as little
delay as possible to the locality of such dispute and shall inquire into the
causes thereof. The parties shall thereupon submit to the Panel complaints
and the causes thereof. The Panel shall fully investigate and inquire into
the matters in controversy, and take testimony under oath in relation to the
alleged violation. The Panel shall render a decision with due speed and
diligence, but within a period not to exceed 90 day investigation and
hearing.
(B) The decision of the arbitration panel shall be final and binding on all
parties.
(C) The arbitration panel may order reinstatement and/or damages for
injury or loss caused by violation of the act, including reasonable attorney's fees.
SECTION

4: CIVIL

ACTION

Suits for violation of arbitration agreements between an employer and
employee may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the
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alleged violation occurred, the county where the person against whom the
civil complaint is filed resides, or in any district court of the United States
where the defendant has their principal place of business.

